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Nature of the Problem 
Both the airline industry and general public are concerned with 
the outcome of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) of 1978 (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1978). Numerous articles have been 
written linking the significant changes in airline service since the 
inception of the ADA. 
Regulation Prior to 1978 
The government has played an active role throughout the 
history of the airline industry. The history prior to deregulation can 
be divided into five distinct eras. Each of these periods has provided 
a historical insight into the effect of regulation on air travel. 
The first major legislation, the Air Mail Act (U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1925), encouraged commercial aviation by 
transferring the movement of mail from the Army to private 
carriers. Congress continued to encourage aviation through the Air 
Commerce Act (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1926), providing 
funds for ground facilities, along with airway and navigational aides. 
Abuses of the Air Mail Act led to the McNary-Waters Act (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1930), which required awarding air mail 
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contracts based on competitive bids. Direct and indirect subsidies 
were provided to the airlines, and the Interstate Commerce 
, Commission was then authorized to govern passenger fares. 
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The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1938) was, arguably, the most important piece of legislation 
prior to deregulation. This act established the Civil Aeronautics 
Authority (CAA), a single economic regulatory body, which helped 
promote and develop the air transportation system. This Act 
grandfathered operating rights to all airlines already in existence and 
contained three major elements: · control of entry and competition, 
control of earning and fares, and control of safety (Van Scyoc, 1987). 
In 1940, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was established to 
take over the responsibilities of the CAA. The Board was given 
authority over economic activities, such as commercial airline routing 
and pricing practices (Kwon, 1991). 
The CAB's focus changed during World War II. Profits were high 
during this period, which piqued the CAB's interest in airline fares. 
Prior emphasis on competition shifted to reflect the public's concern 
for the industry's fare structure. This factor culminated in the 
introduction of the coach fare (Caves, 1962). These new fares 
resulted in yet another shift in profit margins within the industry. 
A Congressional investigation netted the passage of the General 
Passenger Fare Investigation (GPFI), which created a fair rate of 
return policy. The Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, initiated m 
1970, compensated for the shortcomings of the GPFI and instituted a 
formula for determining fares. 
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The regulatory period, 1938 to 1978, saw increasing government 
regulation of the airline industry. Price and route structure was 
carefully controlled- by the CAB, primarily for the protection of the 
major airlines in the industry. 
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 
By 1973, the CAB's regulations had begun to come under attack. 
Both the Postal Service and the Department of Transportation started 
to question the policies of the CAB (Meyer, Oster, Morgan, Berman & 
Strassman, 1981). Additionally, the CAB was being questioned by 
the Federal Trade Commission a.rid other regulating industries for 
allegedly over-protecting the industry from competition. The issues 
raised forced a 1974 Senate subcommittee hearing on the CAB's 
practices. While the subcommittee investigated these charges, the 
Board still continued protecting the trunks. Price floors were 
initiated for supplemental airlines, and industry-wide fare increases 
were allowed. 
In 1975, President Ford proposed legislation to limit the CAB's 
control over the airline industry. This decision supported the 1974 
Senate subcommittee's findings. During 1975 and 1976, numerous 
bills were introduced to the House and Senate for CAB regulatory 
reform, but all failed. The CAB, however, began offering more 
flexibility for setting fares. Discount fares were once again approved 
for the industry, including Texas International's "Peanuts" fare, 
which decreased fares for "off peak" demand, and American's "Super 
Saver" fare. 
In June, 1977, Alfred Kahn was appointed as the new Chairman 
of the CAB. As a supporter of airline deregulation, Kahn argued for 
and directed the CAB to reduce its control over the airlines. The 
Kahn-dominated commission thus began to deregulate the airline 
industry by allowing airlines more freedom, both in pricing and 
entry. 
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Airline deregulation became a reality on October 28, 1978, when 
President Carter signed the Airline Deregulation Act into law. The 
ADA was designed to allow deregulation to take place gradually. 
Two of the issues addressed in the ADA were fare levels and route 
structure. In non-monopoly markets, fares could increase up to 5% 
or decrease by 50% without the Board's approval. The Standard 
Industry Fare Level (SIFL), within which fares could vary, was to be 
reviewed twice a year by the CAB. On January 1, 1983, the fare 
structure of the airlines was to be completely deregulated. Another 
issue in the ADA was the control of route entry into the airline 
industry. The CAB had required two previous stipulations for route 
entry: the new service was "required by the public convenience and 
necessity" and the applicant was "fit, willing, and able" to perform 
the service (O'Connor, 1985, p. 27). New applications for route entry 
were decided on the basis of the "public convenience and necessity" 
requirement. The CAB was extremely restrictive with new route 
entries. The ADA removed the word "required"; accordingly, 
requirements for a new applicant were less stringent between 1978 
and January 1, 1982. Under this more lenient wording, the burden 
of proof shifted from the airline proposing the route change to the 
airline opposing it. 
The ADA also initiated the "automatic market entry" program. 
This entry program allowed any airline to choose a pair of cities 
(origin and destination) to add to its existing route structure. Each 
airline was allowed to add one city pair for each of the transition 
years of 1979, 1980, and 1981. The CAB emphasized application 
approval so that airlines would receive the new routes quickly. 
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On January 1, 1982, the "public convenience and necessity" 
requirement for new routes was removed. The ruling was changed 
so that the airline must only show "fitness" in order to receive a new 
operator's certificate to the industry or to accommodate new routes. 
The ADA also changed the exit control procedures. Before the 
ADA, exit authority was highly regulated, but deregulation eased 
these exit requirements. Route abandonments were now the airline's 
decision; previously, the only method for route exit from the 
industry was either by merger or by acquisition. The CAB had 
approved or disapproved mergers pursuant to the guideline of how 
much impact it would have on competition. Only routes designated 
as "essential" continued to be regulated. 
The final action of the ADA was to dismantle the CAB; the Board 
ceased to exist on December 31, 1984. The functions of the CAB were 
then incorporated into the Department of Transportation. The 
passage of the ADA marked the first time any U.S. industry became 
totally deregulated. 
Statement of the Problem 
Since the passage of the ADA, both the airlines and general 
public have voiced their concern over its effect on the airline 
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industry. These concerns have manifested themselves in the form of 
judicial hearings, studies, and publicly voiced questions from citizen 
groups. In order to validate these concerns, an investigation of the 
regulatory period is necessary. It is also necessary to investigate the 
Act itself to determine if the issues leading up to the ADA were in 
fact addressed. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study will be to examine the factors that 
precipitated the passage of the ADA and describe the issues that 
deregulation attempted to address. Since no previous study covers 
these issues succinctly and comprehensively, there will be three 
basic aspects to the study: (a) to investigate regulation prior to 1978; 
(b) to examine the conclusions of studies conducted referencing this 
era, and; (c) to describe the issues addressed by the passage of the 
ADA. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study will examine the factors that led to the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978 and the issues addressed by its passage. 
For the purposes of this paper, the investigation will only include 
U.S.-based carriers in existence before the passage of the legislation. 
The study will include airlines that are no longer in operation, if they 
were flying prior to deregulation. This examination will include only 




For the purposes of this paper, the following assumptions will be 
made: 
(1) the information gathered from government documents Is a 
true and accurate reflection of the legislation passed; and 
(2) the factors examined and conclusions drawn from 
experimental and analytical studies and referenced documents are 
an accurate account of the events cited. 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this paper, the following definitions will be 
utilized: 
(1) Air Mail Act will refer to the 1925 Congressional 
legislation that encouraged commercial aviation by transferring the 
movement of mail from the Army to private carriers. 
(2) Air Taxi will refer to carriers operating equipment 
lighter than 12,500 pounds; they were unregulated and did not 
provide any scheduled service. 
(3) ALF will refer to Average Load Factor, which Is the 
overall percentage of seats filled with passengers. 
( 4) AT A will refer to the Air Transport Association, formed 
m 1936 to act as a service group to advance the common interests of 
the airline industry. 
(5) CAA will refer to the Civil Aeronautics Authority, 
established in 193 8 as a single economic regulatory body. 
(6) CAB will refer to the Civil Aeronautics Board, 
established in 1940 to take over the duties of the CAA. 
(7) Commuter will refer to a sub-group of the Air Taxis, 
those commuters that did provide scheduled service. 
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(8) DPFI will refer to the Domestic Passenger Fare 
Investigation of 1970, which addressed the shortcomings of the GPFI 
and established a formula for determining fares. 
(9) FAA will refer to the Federal Aviation Administration, 
part of the Department of Transportation, established in 1958 to be 
responsible for the safety regulation of the airline industry. 
(10) GPFI will refer to General Passenger Fare Investigation 
of 1956, in which the CAB approved a set 10.25 % rate of return 
(profit). 
(11) Kelly Act will refer to the Air Mail Act of 1925. 
(12) Local-Service Carriers will refer to carriers who 
operate over routes between smaller cities, and between smaller 
cities and larger cities. 
(13) McNary-Watres Act will refer to the Air Mail Act 
amended in 1930. 
(14) Supplemental will refer to carriers originally known as 
"irregular" or "nonscheduled." 
(15) Trunk (or trunkline) will refer to those airlines initially 
licensed by the CAB in 1938. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OF AIRLINE REGULATION 
Regulation Prior to 1978 
Throughout its history, a1r transportation has been significantly 
influenced by government. While airplanes were first used by the 
Army for air mail delivery prior to 1920, air movement of 
passengers did not commence until the early 1930s. The history of 
air transportation is relatively young; in spite of its youth, however, 
the industry's history has been shaped by past government 
regulation and present deregulation. 
The history of the airline industry pnor to deregulation can be 
divided into five periods: its inception through 1938; 1938 through 
World War II; Post-World War II; 1956-1970, and; 1970-1978. This 
chapter will provide a review of these historical eras and examme 
studies relative to these five periods in airline regulation history. 
Regulation Prior to 1938 
The history of the airline industry pnor to deregulation can be 
divided into five periods. The first era dates from the beginning of 
air transportation and ends in 1938 when the first regulatory act 
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was passed. In 1916, Congress made $50,000 available for airmail 
service out of its "steamboat or other powerboat service" 
appropriation. World War I interrupted further development; 
however, before the war ended in 1918, Congress appropriated 
$100,000 for the establishment of an experimental airmail route, m 
addition to funds already earmarked for the purchase, operation, and 
maintenance of airplanes (Kane & Vose, 1975). Scheduled air service 
began on May 15, 1918, when, utilizing World War I surplus planes, 
the Army began moving mail from New York to Philadelphia, then on 
to Washington, D. C. (Taneja, 1987a). On August 12, 1918, The U.S. 
Aerial Mail Service, as it was called, came under the control of the 
Post Office. 
The first regular year-round a1r passenger route, from Los 
Angeles to San Diego, did not begin until 1925. Early attempts at 
passenger air transportation were rarely successful, as the new 
aircraft -- in terms of safety, speed, and range -- could barely 
compete with ground transportation. The only successful early air 
passenger service was among various islands and the U.S. mainland; 
the early aircraft competed with boat transportation. But as 
transcontinental airmail service was introduced, the real advantages 
of the air mode were demonstrated. By 1925, the Post Office had 
built an airway structure for these new transcontinental routes and 
developed a system of night lighting and landing fields at locations 
from New York to San Francisco. In 1918, a sum of $13,604 was 
appropriated for the Post Office Air Mail service, and by 1926 it 
grew to $2,885,000 (Locklin, 1972; Davies, 1972; Meyer, Oster, 
Morgan, Berman, & Strassman, 1981). By 1924, the government 
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provided continuous day and nighttime transcontinental airmail 
service (Lieb, 1978). 
Commercial air transportation m the U.S. began with a subsidized 
airmail service operated by the United States Post Office and a 
number of small passenger compames. During this time, numerous 
attempts were made to legislate and regulate the aviation industry. 
The Air Mail Act (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1925), also known 
as the Kelly Act, was not only the first major piece of U.S. civil 
aeronautics legislation, it also encouraged commercial aviation by 
transferring the movement of mail from the Army to private 
earners. Congress drafted this legislation to simultaneously 
encourage air development and avoid a "subsidy" battle with the 
highway and railroad industries. The Kelly Act formed the basis for 
the subsequent development of the U.S. domestic airline passenger 
system (Thayer, 1965; Van Scyoc, 1987; Kucinski, 1990). 
Under the Kelly Act, private airlines were awarded airmail 
contracts by the Postmaster General. Though competitive bids were 
not required under this law, the Postmaster General did use them, 
and the Kelly Act stated that compensation was to be "at such rate 
not to exceed four-fifths of the revenues derived from such first-
class mail" (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1925, p. 805). Airline 
compensation was tied to the number of pieces of mail carried, not to 
airline operating costs. This source of compensation resulted in an 
arbitrary system in which the Post Office and the carriers counted 
letters to determine the subsidy. 
The Kelly Act was amended in 1926, changing the basis for 
airline compensation to $3.00 per pound for the first 1,000 miles and 
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$0.30 per pound for each additional 100 miles or fraction thereof. 
Therefore, pending Post Office approval, this change allowed carrier 
compensation to actually exceed revenues. The resulting effect was 
that postal revenues, carrier compensation, and carrier costs became 
independent of one another. Bidding for the airmail routes was 
restricted to companies deemed by the Postmaster General to be 
properly equipped and experienced, giving the Post Office tight 
control over all the airlines (Meyer et al., 1981 ). 
In February, 1927, the Postmaster General lessened the base 
postage rate by discontinuing zone rates and adopting a standard ten 
cent rate per 1/2 ounce. Together with the world-wide publicity of 
Lindbergh's solo transatlantic flight, this rate change led to nearly a 
60% (by weight) increase of airmail carried. 
One year later, Congressman Kelly again amended his Act. Under 
this amendment, route certificates, which were limited to 4 years 
under the Act and a 2-year duration in practice, were extended to a 
IO-year maximum limit. The Postmaster General was also allowed to 
cut rates down to five cents per 1/2 ounce letter. Congressman 
Kelly's intention was to reduce the poundage rate used for calculating 
airline compensation by using the potential of increased volume. 
However, the postage rate was reduced without any poundage rate 
concess10ns by the airlines, thereby defeating this part of the 
amendment; consequently, the volume of airmail nearly doubled, 
along with airline revenues. Cost of airline operation, however, 
remained relatively unchanged, as there was ample spare airline 
capacity, even after the doubling of the volume. 
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The poundage system of payments to the airlines invited 
massive abuse. "Airlines, or their agents, would simply mail some 
packages back and forth because postage was much less than the 
airline compensation. Other anxieties arose over the haphazard 
nature of airline route coverage and the hospitality of passenger 
service" (Meyer et al., 1981, p.15). President Hoover and his 
Postmaster General, William Brown, became alarmed at these events, 
leading to the last amendment to . the Kelly Act, the enactment of the 
McNary-Watres Act (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1930). David's 
(1934) description of the three major provisions of the Watres Act is 
as follows: 
1. The poundage system of airline compensation could be 
changed to a space payment system, set at $1.25 per mile maximum, 
to be paid regardless of the amount of airmail carried. 
2. The 10-year route certificates were retained and these 
certificates could be awarded by the Postmaster General after 
renegotiation. 
3. The Postmaster General could extend routes or consolidate 
them "when in his judgments the public interest will be promoted 
thereby," m effect to ease the problem of unnecessary short routes 
(p. 81). 
The McNary-Watres Act required companies to submit 
competitive bids for routes, and bids were restricted to companies 
that had run an air transportation operation with a fixed daily 
schedule over a distance of not less than 250 miles and for a period 
of not less than 6 months prior to the advertisement for the bids. As 
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a safety precaution, Postmaster Brown insisted on night flying 
experience. 
This Act also provided incentives for the airlines to fly longer 
routes (as compensation previously had been the same for flying 300 
miles as 1,000 miles). But these restrictions made entry into the 
industry more difficult. Postmaster General Brown tried to expand 
the U.S. domestic system, while avoiding competition on awarded 
routes; he used his power as route awarder to streamline and 
stabilize the industry. By 1932, 90% of ·the $19.4 million paid to 
airmail contractors had been awarded to only three companies 
(Biederman, 1982). Given the tremendous growth of the U.S. airline 
system during these early years, it is highly probable that without 
the Postmaster General's controlling policies, many additional airlines 
would have entered the industry. Supplemental payments increased 
to approximately $15 million per annum by 1933, clearly helping the 
growth rate of the airlines. The Act also changed the method of 
compensation from a "poundage" system to a "space" system. 
Airlines were paid for moving mail based on the allotted space for 
the mail, regardless of the amount of mail actually carried. This 
policy encouraged the airlines to solicit passenger traffic for 
increased revenues. This increased passenger traffic also developed 
the need for more modern aircraft (David, 1934 ). 
Irregularities in the Postmaster's actions put the airlines on the 
1933 agenda of the Special Committee on Investigation of the Air 
Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts. When the results of this investigation 
were announced in February, 1934, President Roosevelt canceled the 
Air Mail Contracts and nullified the Kelly Act. The President then 
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ordered the U.S. Army Air Corps to assume responsibility for 
carrying the airmail. However, the Army provided poor service; they 
were ill-equipped and untrained for the task, and there was much 
publicity about loss of twelve pilot lives and $5 million in equipment 
damage (Aeronautic Chamber of Commerce of American, 1937). 
After four months of disastrous Army service, President Roosevelt 
ordered that competitive bids be submitted for temporary mail 
contracts to last until Congress could enact new legislation (Button, 
1991). 
The awarding of routes from these new bids was a maJor event 
m the development of the U.S. domestic airline system, for it was this 
overall structure that persisted until deregulation. On the shorter 
routes, some new companies entered the industry, but the longer 
routes were kept by the four major carriers (American, Eastern, 
TWA, and United), mainly because only they had the equipment and 
training to fly these routes (Meyer et al., 1981). Subsequently, the 
Air Mail Act of 1934 (Black-McKeller Act) was passed. 
The Air Mail Acts (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934) 
transferred the authority for setting payments for air mail from the 
Postmaster General to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC); 
however, the Postmaster General continued to exercise influence on 
the development of the airline industry. The frequency of scheduled 
flights, the number of intermediate stops, and the time of departures 
continued to be prescribed by the Postmaster General; by virtue of 
air mail subsidies and its regulatory controls, the Post Office 
Department still molded the early structure of the airline industry 
(Van Scyoc, 1987). 
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The Air Mail Act promoted au transportation by means other 
than air mail contracts. The Air Commerce Act (U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1926) relieved private airlines of the financial 
burden of providing their own ground facilities, fostering the 
development of airway and navigational aids. Since airlines were 
subsidized by distance and not by the quantity of mail, the McNary-
Watres Act encouraged airlines to carry passengers for additional 
revenues; passengers were cross-subsidized by the mail contracts, 
promoting the more rapid development of passenger service. 
Subsidies to the airline industry have been important 
throughout its history. Airline subsidies grew tremendously from 
1939 to 1978. In addition to these direct subsidies, there were 
indirect subsidies to the airlines for such items as the availability of 
weather service and the development and maintenance of airways 
infrastructure (Lieb, 1978). 
Through the Air Mail Act of 1934, the ICC was authorized to 
govern passenger fares and award mail contracts on a competitive 
basis, providing the first regulation of airfare. Subsequently, the Act 
created the Federal Aviation Commission, which studied the air 
industry and recommended to Congress in January, 1935, the 
establishment of a separate regulatory agency. 
The Report of the Federal A via ti on Commission highlighted the 
following recommendations: 
1. The Commission recommended a comprehensive system of 
regulation of air carriers. 
2. The Commission recommended against giving the Interstate 
Commerce Commission jurisdiction over air carriers and favored the 
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creation of a separate commission to exercise the given regulatory 
powers. 
3. The Commission recognized that air transport could not 
exist, at its stage of development, without some form of direct 
government aid. 
4. The Commission favored a competitive organization for the 
airline industry, believing that the high quality of American air 
transport was due in large part to the competitive spirit that had 
existed throughout its development. 
5. However, the Commission believed that the competition 
should be a carefully controlled competition. 
6. The Commission recommended that payments for the 
carrymg of mail should be kept separate from the direct financial aid 
given to the airlines (Locklin, 1972). 
The airline industry was also m favor of a separate regulatory 
body. Before 1938, the industry was simultaneously governed by 
three different bodies (Post Office, ICC, and Department of Commerce, 
which regulated safety). The airline companies, along with the trade 
association, Air Transportation Association (AT A), agreed that it 
would be easier and less confusing to have only one governmental 
agency responsible for airline regulation. The Air Transport 
Association, acting as a service group to the airline industry, outlined 
three goals: ( 1) to advance the common interests of the certificated 
airline industry, (2) to develop better services for the public, and (3) 
to share in national defense. Member airlines financially supported 
the Association, and they used the talents of the airline industry to 
tackle a wide range of common interests, from standardization of 
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new aircraft to the cutting of red tape for international travel. They 
had a common motive: to maintain the best system of air 
transportation for the airline, the national economy, and the general 
public (Kane & Vose, 1975). 
The depression forced financial difficulties on the airline 
industry. Some industry experts also believed that competition 
caused additional financial burden. Some carriers were making 
extremely low bids (below cost), in order to obtain air mail contracts, 
thus causing financial problems for the whole community. 
A regulatory bill was drafted by the airlines and the AT A, 
working in conjunction with the three different governmental 
agencies. Watson (1979) asserted that "the Act of 1938 was passed 
because of the airline Companies; they shaped the legislation and the 
lobbied it through to passage ... No wonder then that the scheduled 
airlines are so fond of the Civil Aeronautics Act--it is their set of 
rules" (p. 67). 
The government agreed with the airlines and the AT A that 
competition in the industry was destructive. The government's 
heavy investment in the airline industry was threatened by 
unrestricted competition. The passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 
193 8 drew support from the government and the airlines, thereby 
beginning the second period in the industry's history. 
1938 through World War II 
During the 1930s, air transportation regulation was largely 
influenced by the Great Depression. The .Depression had hit the 
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American economic system so hard that the concept of open 
competition came under attack. Most of the economic regulation in 
the 1930s was in response to the prevalent "excessive" or "cut-
throat" competition. Such competition eroded the American work 
philosophy and resulted in wide-scale bankruptcies, costly products, 
and disorganized services (Meyer et al., 1981; Wheatcroft, 1964 ). 
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, flying was an expensive and 
high-risk venture in which only a few companies (and passengers) 
engaged. The fragile conditions of the developing national air 
transportation system needed some government protection and 
regulation (Kwon, 1991). Because of the subsidies present in the 
highly competitive industry, regulation was demanded. In this 
environment, bidding for new routes and services could be approved 
at prices far below cost, allowing for future expansion and using the 
subsidies to compensate for the cost/price difference. This action 
occurred frequently among the airlines in the 1930s, and in order to 
minimize subsidy payments, the government decided to squelch this 
costly competition (Panzar, 1980). In response to this intervention, 
Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1938), which established the Civil Aeronautics Authority, a 
single economic regulatory body whose purpose was to help promote, 
develop, and financially stabilize the air transportation system 
(Reynolds-Feighan, 1992). 
Until the ADA of 1978, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 formed 
the legal basis for the Civil Aeronautics Authority's policies. The Act 
of 1938 addressed two fundamental issues: air safety and economic 
regulation. It separated safety issues by creating an Air Safety 
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Board (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938) independent from the 
Air Carrier Economic Regulation (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1938) aspect of the bill. The mandate to the Authority was to 
consider "the public interest, and in accordance with the public 
convenience and necessity" formed the following objectives: 
a) the encouragement and development of an air-transportation 
system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the 
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal 
Service, and of national defense; 
b) the regulation of air transportation m such a manner as 
to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the 
highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions 
in such transportation, and to improve the relations between and 
coordinate transportation by air carriers; 
c) the promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient 
service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust 
discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or 
destructive competitive practices; 
d) competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound 
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted 
to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United 
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense; 
e) the regulation of air commerce in such a manner as to best 
promote its development and safety; and 
f) the encouragement and development of civil aeronautics (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1938). 
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The CAA consists of five members appointed for a maximum of a 
six-year term. Of the five board members, no more than three can 
be from the same political party. Members are appointed by the 
President (with Senate approval) and "shall have no pecumary 
interest in or own any stock in or bonds of any civil aeronautics 
enterprise" (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938, p. 981). An 
Administrator is appointed by the President for executive and 
operational functions (Richmond, 1961 ). 
The Board exercises its power independently; its decisions are 
not subject to review by any agency, except for the approval of the 
President in decisions granting or affecting certificates for overseas 
and foreign air transportation and foreign air carrier permits. 
In general, the Board performs two major functions: 
1. economic regulation of domestic and international United 
States air carrier operations and of the operations of foreign air 
carriers to and from the United States; and 
2. guidance in the establishment and development of 
international air transportation (Kane & Vose, 1975). 
One of the first acts of the CAA was the issuance of 
"grandfather" rights, whereby airlines existing on May 14, 1938, 
were granted permanent certificates for all of their current route 
authorities (Meyer & Oster, 1984, p. 5). No proof of "public 
convenience and necessity" was needed for these airlines, but if they 
wanted to expand to other markets, they were required to show the 
CAA (later the CAB) that they were fit, willing and able to serve, and 
filled a public need (Morrison & Winston, 1986; Finsinger, 1983). 
They were also required to show that expanding to new routes would 
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not place a financial burden on existing airlines serving those routes 
(O'Connor, 1982). 
These "grandfathered" certificates provided the basis for 
regulation in the airline structure. There were sixteen airlines m 
existence in 1938 (See Appendix A). No new carriers were allowed 
to enter this group during the 40 years of regulation, even though 
demand grew rapidly and entry applicants were abundant. Fares 
were required to be published and observed; any change in fares had 
to be approved by the CAB in a lengthy process, and all fares needed 
to be "just and reasonable." Fares could not be discriminatory, and 
there was no long and short-haui provision in the Act, as there was 
in the railroad industry. CAB control over the industry was 
considerable. 
The report by the Federal Aviation Commission in 1935 (the 
major influence on the Act of 1938) provided the following 
recommendation: "It should be the general policy to promote 
competition in the interest of improved service and technological 
development, while avoiding uneconomical paralleling of routes and 
duplication of facilities." The same report cautioned: "On the other 
hand, too much competition can be as bad as too little. To allow half 
a dozen airlines to eke out a hand-to-mouth existence where there is 
enough traffic to support one really first-class service and one alone 
would be a piece of folly" (Pulsifer, 1976, p.61). The 1938 Act 
reformed and institutionalized the method of promoting au 
transportation by means of direct federal subsidies. 
Another early act of the new CAA instituted further 
development of the national airport system and included a budget of 
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$125 million for these developments. In June, 1940, the CAA was 
reorganized into the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The Air Safety 
Board was abolished, but its functions were infused into the CAB. The 
role of the Administrator and related airport and airway 
development activities were transferred to the Department of 
Commerce (Solberg, 1979). 
The Post-World War II Period 
The World War II era saw the inception of the third major 
period in airline history. The beginning of World War II drew the 
airlines and military into close contact with one another. Military 
demands for aircraft reduced the number of commercial airline 
aircraft to less than half, but wartime activity resulted in high 
demand for remaining services. Airline productivity and efficiency 
improved considerably, and load factors of 80% to 90% were normal 
at this time (Davies, 1972). By July, 1942, the airlines had removed 
all promotional discounts. 
Pricing. 
Profits of the airlines were extremely high during this period, 
prompting the CAB to become more interested in airline fares. Until 
this time, the CAB paid little attention to fares, instead concentrating 
on the gradual reduction of the number of monopoly routes enjoyed 
by the "grandfathered" airlines. However, these wartime conditions 
led to extremely high profit levels, and the CAB ordered the eleven 
largest domestic trunk carriers to reduce fares by 10% or show cause 
why the reduction was not possible. After six airlines filed decreases 
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of less than 10%, the CAB chose to drop the investigation. As Caves 
(1962) noted, "Under war and depression conditions, the role of price 
in performing a rationing function diverges from its role in returning 
a normal yield to factors of production" (p. 143). 
Due to the high profit levels at the end of World War II, the CAB 
reduced both airmail compensation and passenger fares, despite the 
protests of smaller carriers who feared (correctly) that a fall in l.oad 
factors would occur during the postwar period (Hudson, 1972). 
Furthermore, a plentiful supply of aircraft and pilots released from 
military duty further aggravated the declining profits. 
Another major development in the airline industry at this time 
was the introduction of coach fares. Prior to 1948, the airlines 
offered only one-class service, although special fares were sometimes 
given for certain occasions or to specific groups (Locklin, 1972). The 
reduced ( or Coach) fare idea for regular carriers was influenced by 
the low fares and less expensive accommodations offered by the 
irregular air carriers (Jones & Davis, 1950). The CAB was reluctant to 
allow these coach fares because of excess capacity and the resulting 
low profits. Historically, the CAB had maintained the financial health 
of the industry by concentrating on overall airline profit levels, not 
on setting fares. It believed that these low fares would only create 
an additional financial burden to the industry. The end of the war 
brought a huge decrease in load factors and increased competition 
from the large irregulars (non-scheduled charter airlines). In 1948, 
Capital Airlines proposed a coach fare at a time when the CAB was 
concurrently granting a series of fare increases to offset falling 
airline profits. The coach fares were approved but contained a 
24 
considerable number of use restrictions. During the Korean Conflict, 
the Board expanded the coach fare, pricing it not to exceed 75% of 
the first class fares. Though the Board granted a series of fare 
increases through the declining load factor years following World 
War II, it encouraged experimentation with promotional fares and 
fares aimed at off-peak travel. Eventually, the discounts which had 
been abandoned during World War II returned ("Odds look," 1977). 
Its increasing popularity induced the CAB to extend the use of coach 
fares during the Korean Conflict. 
Feeder airlines. 
Under considerable political pressure, the CAB announced on 
March 22, 1943, that it would study the possibility of local service or 
"feeder" airlines. Feeder airline routes would be of short distance 
and low density (Finsinger, 1983). The CAB feared that feeder routes 
(short-haul low-density segments connecting smaller communities in 
outlying areas with larger airports) would face stiff competition from 
rail, bus, and automobile transportation. Furthermore, these small 
communities (normally a population under 50,000) were not 
expected to generate adequate daily passenger traffic to support 
profitable operation. After an investigation which generated little 
ecqnomic need for feeder service but confirmed the political support 
behind them, the CAB decided to try experimental feeder routes. Two 
safeguards, however, were incorporated into these experimental 
feeder routes: (1) such authorizations were limited .in time (three 
years in most cases), and (2) these operations were confined to those 
that did not require unacceptable levels of subsidy (Meyer & Oster, 
1984; Molloy, 1985). 
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Until this time, no airline entry had been granted if it would 
compete with any part of the established trunk system. The first 
issue with which this investigation dealt was whether these feeder 
services, for which there were many applicants, should be awarded 
to the trunks or to new airline companies. After debating the service 
needs and unique cost structures of these new feeders, the awards 
were made to new carriers. This decision, in part, was based on the 
fact that the trunks were already subsidized and that a successful 
feeder experiment usmg trunks would have caused these subsidies 
(at $14 million m 1942) to rise to potentially unacceptable levels 
(Eads, 1972). 
Deciding the location of the new feeder routes was not easy. The 
CAB considered the probability of financial success and local need, 
but population and length of feeder link was probably the greatest 
influence in reaching a decision. Using population density as a major 
criterion often resulted in feeder airline routes that were in 
competition with good ground transportation. The CAB eventually 
controlled the local service route awards by issuance of "temporary" 
certificates having a three-year limit. However, dropping a city after 
· regular air service had been provided was not an easy matter, 
regardless of the economics of the situation (Eads, 1972). Moreover, 
the CAB implemented the feeder service airlines nationally before 
any review had been made of their decision-making process. 
The CAB strongly avoided competition between the new feeder 
routes and the existing trunks by usually requiring the feeder 
airlines to stop at intermediate points between two cities served by a 
trunk in order to avoid direct competition. In areas where the 
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feeder airlines were allowed more direct competition with the 
trunks, some local carriers became a considerable threat to the trunk 
airline market. 
The "Local, Feeder, and Pick-Up Air Service" investigation (Civil 
Aeronautics Board, 1943) report was pessimistic about proposals for 
a local service network. In this study, the feeder airlines assumed 
flight of a twin-engine aircraft of 10 seats or fewer with a pilot and 
co-pilot only, the co-pilot collecting tickets and stowing baggage. The 
study also assumed an average load of two passengers, ultimately 
requirin'g an airmail/subsidy rate of 25 cents per mile. 
The costs of local service operations were considerably more 
than this subsidy. The major reason for these costs was the use of 
the DC-3 aircraft, a 21-seat aircraft, rather than the originally 
planned smaller 10-seat aircraft. This larger aircraft provided an 
image similar to that of the trunks, but it also increased operating 
costs. The larger aircraft also necessitated some cabin crews and in-
flight service, further increasing costs. 
The CAB's response to these higher costs was to increase the 
subsidy. The other local service airlines quickly learned that the 
additional operating costs would not be a problem (Eads, 1972). 
Direct subsidy payments ran approximately $20 million annually m 
the mid-1950s, peaking at $63 million in 1963 (Caves & Roberts, 
1975). When it was time to re-certify the local service airlines, all 
those equipped with DC-3s were renewed, despite the much higher 
than expected subsidy levels. In 1955, Congress issued permanent 
operating certificates to those local service airlines. 
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The CAB, however, forced substantial restrictions on the routes 
and operating freedom of the local service airlines. Even so, during 
the 1950s, the local service airlines became the major recipient of 
subsidy money. In order to reduce the amount of subsidy given to 
the local service airlines, the CAB instituted a policy to strengthen 
their routes. This policy addressed four areas: (1) liberalization of 
route restrictions placed on the local service airlines; (2) transfer of 
weaker trunkline points to the local service airlines; (3) a "use it or 
lose it" policy which ensured each location enplaned at least 5 
passengers per day or risk losing its service, and; (4) addition of new 
routes, often to points that had been without airline service (Meyer 
& Oster, 1984, p. 15). 
The route strategies adopted by the CAB did not diminish the 
rise of the subsidies paid to the local service airlines. In fact, the 
transfer of weak points from the trunks and the addition of new and 
more marginal routes weakened the local service airlines and led to 
an increased need for subsidies. Moreover, there was considerable 
incentive under the subsidy system for the local service airlines to 
improve their fleets, thereby increasing their subsidies (Eads, 1972). 
In 1952, Pioneer replaced its DC-3 fleet with Martin 202s; its action 
was followed by a similar move by Southwest. The Martin, with 36 
seats, was considerably more expensive to operate than the DC-3s. 
The CAB, in response, refused to allow an increase in subsidy and 
Pioneer (though not Southwest) was forced to reaquire the DC-3 
aircraft. (In 1955 Pioneer merged with Continental Air Lines, a 
trunk and its chief competitor). 
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Supplemental airlines. 
When the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act was passed, airlines 
offering only nonscheduled service from a fixed base were not 
clearly included. In October, 1938, such fixed-base nonscheduled 
operations were given an exemption and allowed to continue. After 
World War II, many ex-military pilots bought surplus military 
aircraft and started nonscheduled service. This action caused great 
concern to the CAB. 
A 1944 investigation yielded recommendations that the CAB 
permit these supplemental carriers to fly up to 10 frequencies per 
month between points other than the principal place of business (the 
fixed base). The CAB rejected these recommendations; instead the 
CAB attempted to define more precisely the meaning of "regularly" 
as it applied to these operations. If passengers were reasonably sure 
that trips will be operated on a set schedule, and the only question is 
whether space could be obtained on such flights, then the operation 
qualifies as a regularly scheduled air carrier (Rattner, 1976). This 
clarification was issued in a CAB directive that required the 
nonscheduled carriers to operate only limited irregular flights. 
However, the new nonscheduled airlines were operating more 
"regular" flights and competing directly with the certified carriers for 
traffic. On May 5, 1947, the CAB required that all nonscheduled 
earners be categorized either as large carriers ( operating more than 
10,000 pounds gross take-off weight or three or more aircraft with 
an aggregate weight of more than 25,000 pounds gross take-off 
weight) or small carriers, and that large carriers be required to take 
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out letters of registration. By August 6, 1948, the CAB closed the 
"large irregular" class with 109 registrations in effect (Meyer, 1981). 
On May 20, 1949, the CAB revoked its blanket exemption for the 
large irregulars and required each carrier to apply for an individual 
certificate. In November, 1949, the CAB required ticketing for all 
passengers on the large irregular carriers, and it prohibited the 
combining of operations with other irregulars to produce the effect of 
providing an overall regular service (Van Scyoc, 1987). 
The CAB further limited the large irregulars' schedules to 3 
flights in one direction between 13 pairs of cities and 8 flights per 4 
weeks m the same direction between any other cities. The large 
irregulars continued to have problems with flight cancellations and 
poor equipment maintenance; thus when fifteen irregulars applied 
for certificates for regular coach service along with their applications 
for individual "large irregular" status, all fifteen were denied on the 
grounds that · such service would result in excessive and destructive 
competition with the existing carriers (Holsendolph, 1977a). 
The debate continued over the role of irregulars, and after the 
Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation of 1951, the CAB concluded 
that irregulars did provide a valuable service. In particular, charter 
operations, military support, and low-fare flights were singled out as 
benefits provided by the large irregulars not supplied by the 
certificated carriers. The large irregulars were reclassified as 
Supplemental Carriers, and the CAB specifically encouraged their 
development. 
After the Korean Conflict, the airlines once again saw declining 
loads and resulting poor returns. In 1952, the carriers asked the 
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Board's approval for a $1 per ticket fare increase and removal of 
round-trip discounts. The fare increase was granted, but the round-
trip discount remained. These requests resulted in a CAB order 
calling for a general investigation of the levels and structure of 
passenger fares. Until that time, no such investigation had ever been 
made. Earnings improved significantly in late 1952 and in 1953, and 
the airlines feared that an investigation would result in lower fares. 
After sustained arguments from the carriers, the Board was 
convinced to cancel the investigation; however, in 1956, under 
extreme Congressional pressure, the CAB did institute the General 
Passenger Fare Investigation (GPFI). 
1956 - 1970 
The late 1950s evidenced a maJor investment program for the 
new jet aircraft and facilities. Passenger revenues in 1957 exceeded 
$1.3 billion, and traffic increased fourfold, from 6 billion passenger 
miles in 1948 to 25 billion in 1957. The airlines planned to spend 
$2.8 billion over the next five years for aircraft and facility 
acquisitions (Cherington, 1958b). The Government Guaranty of 
Equipment Loans Act (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957) 
authorized the CAB to guarantee loans to local service carriers 
enabling them to update their equipment, while the Airways 
Modernization Act (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957) provided 
funds for further development and modernization of navigational 
systems and traffic control facilities (Carroll, 1975). 
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The GPFI coincided with the arrival of the jet age and a period of 
low earnings from the recession of the late 1950s (Straszheim, 1969). 
Moreover, the airlines had enjoyed many years of high profit rates, 
and the trunk earners were largely without subsidy support. The 
Board therefore focused on the fare level rather than its structure, 
while acknowledging inquires from Congress, which had been critical 
of the Board's inactivity on the matter (Redford, 1965; OECD, 1988). 
The GPFI hearings lasted until 1958. During this time, many 
carriers filed for higher rates, citing the higher costs of jet aircraft. 
The CAB policy of the early 1950s was to set fares so that they did 
not fall below "the level necessary to provide a fare return over a 
reasonably extended period which includes the good years as well as 
the bad" (Caves, 1962, pp. 283-284). 
The CAB used this philosophy to respond to the airlines' 
demands of 1956 and early 1957, stating that the costs of jet 
equipment and routes were of a temporary nature. However, bad 
economic times and Presidential pressure convinced the CAB to grant 
a temporary increase of 4% plus $1 per ticket, despite the high 
profits earned over the past years. The carriers then requested to 
eliminate the round-trip discounts and free stopovers and to have 
the family fare discount cut from one-half to one-third. These 
requests were granted by the CAB (Caves, 1962). 
The GPFI hearings finally concluded in August of 1958; however, 
the Board's opinion was not issued until November 25, 1960, nearly 
five years after the investigation started. The rate of return for the 
large trunk airlines was set at 10.5%, 12.0% for the smaller trunks. 
The period over which this average was to be achieved was left 
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flexible (indefinite) because no "mechanical device" or mathematical 
formula was acceptable for determining the correct time period and 
short-term considerations were not to be ignored. The Board also 
stated that the "unreliability of the forecasts and the lack of data in 
the record reflecting jet operations" made it impossible to determine 
an overall appropriate level of fares (Meyer et al., 1981, p. 22, 
McShan, 1986). Therefore, the GPFI failed to produce a standard for 
setting levels, which was a major impetus for initiating the 
investigation. Many other issues were also left open by the Board, 
including the use of standard load factors and standard costs (Taneja, 
1987b ). The CAB did conclude, however, that general fare increases 
did not solve the financial problems of the weak carriers (Redford, 
1965). 
The Federal Aviation Act (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1958) created the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) to replace the Civil 
Aeronautics Administration and assume its functions. The new FAA 
would assume two major areas from the old CAA. First, they were 
given full responsibility and authority for the advancement and 
enforcement of all safety regulations. Second, they assumed full 
responsibility for management of the national airspace system, 
including enforcement of air traffic rules and development and 
operation of air-navigation facilities. The Civil Aeronautics Board, 
however, continued its jurisdiction over the investigation of air 
accidents. In 1966, the Department of Transportation Act (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1966) transferred both the air safety 
powers of the FAA and the accident investigation powers of the CAB 
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to the National Safety Board of the newly created Department of 
Transportation. 
Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the CAB continued as 
the regulatory agency, with no change in policy; there was no intent 
to change the statute relating to economic regulation or to change the 
policies of the Board in administering it. Additionally, the Civil 
Aeronautics Board became an independent agency, not attached to 
the Department of Commerce as it had been since 1940 (Locklin, 
1972; Rochester, 1976; Burkhardt, 1967). 
By 1959, all the trunk earners were operating without subsidy 
(Northeast Airlines returned to subsidized status for a short time m 
1963). The CAB had negated subsidy needs for the trunks by 
awarding promising routes to the weaker trunk lines. (Appendix B 
shows the subsidies awarded to the certificated airlines from 1943 
through 1978) When the trunks were receiving subsidies, the 
amounts were essentially an internal balancing question for the CAB; 
good financial health of companies could be affected almost as well 
through subsidy or fare levels or route extensions, all other things 
being equal. To promote the industry, the CAB concentrated on route 
expansion, while maintaining subsidies at acceptable levels. The 
postwar profits enjoyed by the large trunks removed the need for 
subsidies and left fare levels as the major economic control over 
trunk activities. 
1970 - 1978 
The late 1960s saw increasing competition among the earners. 
Although the pnces and routes were fixed, frequency of flights and 
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capacity levels were not. The airlines flew with high frequency and 
low loads. In 1970, the CAB conducted hearings into the falling 
airline profits of the late 1960s. Members of Congress requested to 
attend, but the CAB rejected their request. The Congressmen carried 
their action to court; m response to this action, the CAB commenced 
the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation (DPFI) on January 19, 
1970. 
The DPFI was the Board's first analysis of its fare policies (Bailey, 
Graham, & Kaplan, 1985). During the GPFI, the CAB had agreed only 
on a reasonable rate of return and had stipulated that fares should 
be brought into closer alignment with costs; no load factor controls 
had been established. However, during the 1960s, the average load 
factor (ALF) for the trunks had fallen from 59.3% to 50.0% . The 
DPFI therefor set out to make up for the shortcomings of the GPFI 
and develop a formula for determining fares (Meyer et al., 1981; 
Kasper, 1988). 
DPFI issues were broken into two areas, fare levels and fare 
structures. In considering fare levels, the CAB agreed with an earlier 
study conducted by the Department of Transportation which showed 
that higher fares caused airlines to offer higher capacity and 
consequently reduce the ALF. The high-fare/low-ALF phenomenon 
led the CAB to set standards for seating configurations on different 
aircraft types. Fares were to be tied to an ALF of 55% for trunks and 
44% for local service. Fare levels were also to be tied to a 12% rate of 
return. 
During the GPFI period, the airlines competed by offering more 
frequent service, thereby driving up costs and decreasing the 
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airline's rate of return. This cost could at least nominally be passed 
on to the consumer, as fares were set to reflect cost and provide a 
certain rate of return (Fruhan, 1972). Now with fares presupposing a 
certain load factor, there would presumably be a more predictable 
relationship between fares and revenues. 
Fares were structured to reflect the cost of service. Prior to the 
DPFI, airline fares tended to be linearly applied. However, the 
average costs of aircraft operation decreased per passenger mile and 
thus long-haul operations were more profitable, subsidizing the less 
profitable short hauls. The DPFI changed this structure by increasing 
the "distance taper" in the rates, thus raising short-haul fares and 
lowering long-haul fares (Wyckoff & Maister, 1977, p. li). The CAB's 
rate calculations are shown in Appendix C. One other proposed fare 
structure change came in response to an American Airlines request 
of a "zone of reasonableness" for fares. They wanted the C,f\B to set a 
standard fare, above or below which the airlines would be allowed to 
adjust 10%. This adjustment would allow for changes rn market 
condition and competition. The CAB rejected the zone of 
reasonableness, maintaining that all airlines would simply set their 
fares at the maximum of the zone. 
The final issue with which the DPFI dealt was discount pncrng. 
In the past, discount pricing was seen as promoting the airline 
industry, thus helping the industry with the problem of excess 
capacity. On the issue of pricing, the CAB found that all youth, 
family, and other discount fares were discriminatory and therefore 
illegal, and such fares were required to be eliminated within 18 
months. This action was contrary to previous CAB action when such 
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discounts had been actively encouraged for promotional reasons. 
Discount fares were allowed only if the CAB did not judge them to be 
discriminatory, however, the CAB felt that these discount fares were 
so; therefore the youth, family, and "Discover America" discounts 
became illegal after one and one-half years (Taneja, 1987b ). 
In 1970, faced by large financial losses, United Airlines, TWA, 
and American met to discuss the possibility of increasing each 
carrier's load factors. This plan was to be accomplished by a mutual 
agreement to restrict the frequency of flights on long distance routes. 
The initial capacity agreement met with fierce protests from other 
carriers, and the CAB disapproved it on November 6, 1970. The CAB 
did, however, encourage the airlines to find ways of reducing the 
overcapacity they were generating. 
Eventually, TWA, United, and American came to a CAB-approved 
understanding, agreeing to limit capacity in four transcontinental 
markets for one year. The CAB opposed the capacity limitations in 
principle, but allowed it as a temporary measure for helping the 
financial situation of the carriers. 
The capacity limitation agreements proved very effective for the 
three trunk carriers; however, their request for extension of the 
agreement met with strong opposition from smaller carriers. The 
smaller carriers felt this agreement was aimed at decreasing their 
share in the market. After losing a civil case filed by the Department 
of Justice, the CAB rescinded the capacity agreement on July 21, 
1975 (Taneja, 1981). 
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The publicity from constant media attention which had been 
raised through the DPFI period, and the inception of capacity 
agreements, provided a basis for concern about the CAB's policies. 
Toward deregulation: 1973 - 1978. 
The 1970s saw growing public sympathies toward deregulation 
(Doganis, 1985; Caves & Roberts, 1975). The trend toward greater 
regulatory control of the industry peaked as a result of the DPFI. 
The loss of discount pricing, the increase of rigidity and 
standardization in pricing formulas, and the institution of route 
moratoriums and capacity limitation agreements severely limited the 
carriers' ability to control their profitability. Even those carriers 
most strongly opposed to deregulation were not content with the 
current situation and wanted an easing of these restrictions (Morgan, 
1981). 
The publicity which surrounded the capacity limitation 
agreements had attracted the attention of the Department of Justice. 
In October, 1974, Lewis A. Engman, Chairman of the Federal Trade 
Commission, voiced his concerns over the CAB's protection of the 
industry from competition and efficiency (Metz, 1974). Concurrently, 
Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, decided to 
begin preliminary investigations for oversight hearings on the CAB 
which were to take place in February, 1975 (the Kennedy Hearings). 
The purpose of these hearings was to investigate the fairness and 
effectiveness of CAB practices and procedures. 
The CAB, however, was unconcerned with these events. As a 
protective measure for the trunk airlines, they proposed rate floor 
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standards for the supplemental earners m October, 197 4 . The next 
month, the CAB followed with a general 4% fare increase. This 
increase, combined with two other fare increases approved by the 
Board, resulted in an average ticket price increase of 20% between 
December 1973 and December 1974 (Egan, 1974). 
In January, 1975, under mounting Congressional pressure, the 
Board organized an internal task force to explore the issue of 
regulatory reform. The task force investigated current regulation 
policy and recommended less regulation of the industry (Civil 
Aeronautics Board, 1975). 
The CAB's task force recommendations were preempted by 
President Ford's announcement of February 1975, which stated that 
legislation would be proposed to "remove most of the Federal 
Government's control over determining the price of airline tickets 
and in designating which companies may enter the airline business 
and what routes they may fly" (Lindsey, 1975, p. 37). President Ford 
continued by stating that "the rigidly controlled regulatory structure 
now serves to stifle competition, increase cost to travelers, makes the 
industry less efficient than it could be and denies large segments of 
the American public access to lower cost air transportation," and 
further predicted that his proposal would have a "direct and 
beneficial impact" on the American consumer (Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Reports, 1975, p. 2176). 
Pre~ident Ford's statement drew heavy industry criticism and 
CAB opposition. (The President's announcement was also supported 
by the findings of the Kennedy hearings). Numerous reform 
proponents supported the admfoistration's position on the 
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"inequitable, inefficient, and uneconomical" impact of the Board's 
regulatory policies (Burnham, 1975). Numerous economic studies 
were cited indicating that fares were 40-100% higher than necessary 
and that carriers had been forced to fly with excessive frequency 
and to buy unnecessary aircraft to compete (Committee on the 
Judiciary, 1975a). The Kennedy hearings were well chronicled; this 
publicity brought attention to the problem of CAB regulation, the 
resulting inefficiency, and the higher consumer costs. 
The unregulated intra-state markets of California and Texas 
received considerable attention during the Kennedy Hearings, as they 
provided the only empirical evidence on the likely impact of 
deregulation. These markets had fares that were 50% to 70% of the 
CAB-regulated fares for approximately the same distances and kinds 
of routes. The Kennedy report concluded that fares in unregulated 
markets were lower due to the higher load factors and seating 
densities achieved in the intrastate markets (Committee on the 
Judiciary, 1975b). 
The airline industry was not enthusiastic about the possibility of 
deregulation. Airline officials testified at the Kennedy_ Hearings in 
support of continued CAB regulation, stating that the deregulation 
would be disastrous to the industry. They testified that deregulation 
would lead to less competition because the smaller, weaker carriers 
would be forced out of the business. Without CAB protection of route 
authority, the powerful carriers would invade the markets of the 
weaker carriers and charge lower fares, driving the weaker carriers 
out. Subsequently, fares would ultimately increase, as the number of 
carriers would diminish and the quality and dependability of service 
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would decrease. The airline industry felt that the deregulation 
movement was a product of "incorrect economies" (Committee on the 
Judiciary, 1975c). 
The Robson Chairmanship: 1975-1977. 
As pressure mounted from Congress and consumer groups for 
increased competition in the industry, President Ford appointed John 
Robson as Chairman of the CAB in March, 197 5. Robson replaced 
Robert Timm, who had been a strong advocate of regulation and an 
enthusiastic supporter of the capacity limitation agreements. 
The CAB's new staff report on regulatory reform advocated an 
end to the tight regulation controls of fares, rates, and entry by the 
CAB. The industry still feared deregulation, gaining support from 
former CAB Chairman Secor Browne, who warned that the industry 
was on the brink of financial disaster ("Ex-C.A.B.," 1975). 
Simultaneously, the capacity limitation agreements between 
American, TWA, and United were once again voided by the CAB m 
July, 1975, due to a Department of Justice suit against the CAB that 
had found the agreements to be illegal. 
In September, 1975, a new competitive nonstop route authority 
was granted for the first time since the 1970 initiation of the route 
moratorium. The Board concluded that certain markets could 
support and benefit from limited competition. Additionally, the 
Board relaxed charter flight regulations allowing for the sale of 
charter packages with a single destination (the previous rule had 
required three stops). This ruling represented a major change in CAB 
attitude toward the certificated airlines and was a reversal in policy 
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to the previous year's proposal for instituting rate floors for 
supplemental carriers. 
In October, 1975, the Ford Administration proposed legislation 
on regulatory reform. The Aviation Act of 1975 (U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1975) was aimed at stimulating price competition, 
eliminating entry barriers to new markets, and altering the basic 
function and purpose of the CAB (See Appendix D). Once again the 
industry was skeptical, and even CAB Chairman Robson emphasized 
his belief in the need for a gradual transition toward regulatory 
reform, stating his doubts that the Aviation Act would pass Congress 
(Meyer, 1981). 
The CAB policy in the 1960s was to deny petitions for new 
nonstop service in a market . where existing service was satisfactory; 
in November, 1975, the Board reversed this policy and granted 
carriers new route authority. The CAB granted this authority 
because it felt the market could bear additional service when the 
incumbent carrier failed to demonstrate any significant adverse 
effects would result from increased competition, and it was believed 
that the incoming carriers could operate at a profit. 
In April, 1976, the Senate Aviation Subcommittee convened 
hearings on regulatory reform (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1976b). At this time, CAB Chairman Robson delivered his own plan 
for deregulation, indefinitely delaying the total deregulation of the 
airlines. Robson acknowledged that regulation might have been 
responsible for unnecessary hikes in air fares but also emphasized 
that a shift to a deregulated system could cause major disruptions in 
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the industry, including possible financial failures among carriers 
(Committee on Commerce, 1976). 
In response to Senate concerns, the Board took steps to relax 
fare standards and reinstituted discount fares (Meyer & Oster, 1987). 
In July, 1976, the Board allowed lower fares for regulated interstate 
carriers so they could be more competitive with the unregulated 
intrastate carriers in California and Texas. Later in the year, the 
Board removed the 20% discount limit in the mainland United States 
to Puerto Rico/Virgin Island market, giving carriers the ability to set 
new pnces. 
While many airline officials created the regulatory environment, 
the subcommittee ultimately announced that it would propose 
legislation to reduce CAB controls. The Federal A via ti on Act 
Amendments of 1976 was introduced in September, and was aimed 
at fostering greater competition between carriers by allowing more 
flexibility in fare adjustment (U.S~ Government Printing Office, 
1976a). 
During 1976, the CAB continued to grant new competitive route 
authority and make some additional moves toward greater 
liberalization of its policies. It also continued its policy of granting 
competitive authority in markets where service was sufficient but 
whose loads would allow more carriers. In November, for the first 
time, competitive service in the New York-Richmond (trunk) market 
was awarded to a local service airline. These changes occurred 
simultaneously with the relaxing of air charter rules. 
As debate over deregulation intensified, a General Accounting 
Office report released in February, 1977, stated that CAB regulation 
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of air fares had cost American passengers nearly $2 billion annually 
m excess fares between 1969 and 1974 (Holsendolph, 1977a). The 
GAO report urged Congress and the CAB to encourage price 
competition and allow the entry of new carriers into the industry. 
Quickly after this report was published, President Carter announced 
his plan to endorse legislation that would modify industry regulation. 
In March, legislation was introduced to substantially deregulate 
the airline industry. The new legislation allowed carriers to reduce 
fares by 35% and increase fares by 10% without CAB permission. 
This bill enabled the airlines to drop routes with a 90-day notice, 
while giving the CAB power to extend service for an additional 90 
days. The legislation also provided Federal subsidies to promote air 
service in small communities and set a time limit for the CAB to 
process applications for new service ("Odds look," 1977). 
Although President Carter and the majority of Congress backed 
the major provisions of the proposed legislation, the airline industry 
and Chairman Robson still balked at this approach. Then, m April, 
President Carter announced his intention to veto any CAB decision to 
deny low-fare applications unless the CAB could successfully 
demonstrate the wisdom of their actions. A month later, economist 
Alfred Kahn was named to succeed Robson as CAB chairman. 
During his last month in office, Chairman Robson continued to 
relax CAB policies. Most notably, new discount pricing was approved, 
including the "Peanuts" fare proposed by Texas International and 
American's "SuperSaver" fares. The Peanuts fare gave 50 % 
discounts on flights determined as "off-peak" by the carrier, while 
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the SuperSaver allowed scheduled earners to better compete with 
charter fares (Button, 1991). 
The Kahn Era: 1977-1978. 
By the time Chairman Alfred Kahn took office in June of 1977, 
United, Airwest, and Continental had indicated their support of 
deregulation (Holsendolph, 1977b ). Even former Chairman Robson, 
in addition to many consumer groups, now publicly supported 
deregulation, stating that the existing regulatory system was not 
conducive to the financial health of the industry. 
Before he took office, Chairman Kahn was a known supporter of 
deregulation. Under his reign, the CAB continued its liberalizing 
trend approving more discount fares among the trunks and charter 
operators. 
The heated debate over deregulation began to lessen as the 
products of lower fares and liberalized route entry became apparent. 
Despite prediction of a period of lower profits during this time, 
industry profits were increasing, as fares decreased and load factors 
and demand picked up. 
In April, 1978, the CAB initiated a proposal to allow airlines to 
reduce fares up to 50% without Board approval (Civil Aeronautics 
Board, 1978). The proposal eliminated the requirement that first-
class fares be set at 50% over coach fares; the carriers immediately 
reduced their first-class fares to 130% of coach, and eventually to 
120% of coach fares. 
The CAB also simultaneously announced plans to give earners 
greater freedom for route exit and entry. The CAB adopted a "show 
cause" order, whereby people objecting to a new route entrant were 
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required to provide written arguments and defend why the new 
carrier should not be granted entry. Eventually, the Board eased 
entry barriers with the multiple permissive entry policy, whereby all 
applicants were awarded authority on the route, provided they could 
demonstrate financial fitness. 
By June, 1978, business was booming in the airline industry and 
carriers were forced to add seating capacity by whatever means 
possible. The first six months of 1978 showed a 16% increase in 
revenue passenger miles, profits up 16.3%, and load factors 20% 
higher than the previous year (Meyer et al., 1981). 
On April 19, 1978, the United States Senate voted 83-0 in favor 
of legislation (U.S. Congress, 1978c) which granted greater freedom 
for the airlines to compete. More specifically, the bill allowed entry 
by new carriers without CAB approval, entry and exit rule relaxation, 
guaranteed subsidies to small communities to maintain essential air 
service, and new pricing freedom to carriers on competitive routes. 
On September 21, 1978, the House voted 363-8 on legislation 
(U.S. Congress, 1978b) similar to the Senate-approved bill, that 
additionally called for the abolition of the CAB within 5 years. 
After minimal discussions, a compromise bill was passed m 
both houses. The compromise legislation allowed airlines to reduce 
fares by as much as 50% without CAB approval and to assume a 
number of new routes each year without approval. The CAB was 
directed to promote airline competition, even as its authority to 
supervise airline pricing and route decisions was curtailed. The 
remaining powers of the Board, to regulate carrier service routes, 
were scheduled to terminate on December 31, 1981; rate regulation 
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would cease on January 1, 1983, and by January 1, 1985, the CAB's 
residual responsibilities were to be transferred to other agencies, and 
the Board abolished (Brown, 1987). 
On October 24, 1978, President Carter signed the Airline 
Deregulation Act (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978) into law. 
For the first time in U.S. history, a regulated industry was now totally 
deregulated. 
Studies of Airline Regulation 
To understand fully the impact of airline deregulation on market 
performance, a knowledge of research during the regulatory period 
is needed. The theoretical and empirical work on airline regulation 
will be reviewed, and the literature dealing with airline regulation 
will provide models to predict and test industry behavior after 
regulation. 
Gill and Bates (1949) studied the effects of regulation during the 
industry's youth. They studied the effects of competition under the 
CAA in terms of quality of service provided, prices charged for such 
service, and the self-sufficiency of the industry. 
Their findings supported the conclusion that competitive air 
transportation regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was in 
the public's best interest. Such regulated competition was one of the 
most important factors influencing the constant growth and 
development of the industry. 
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Airlines competed by offering different types of flight 
equipment, passenger services, and flexible scheduling. However, 
they found multiple-carrier competition (where more than two 
carriers are authorized to serve major markets) to be adverse to the 
public interests. 
Cherington (1958a) was another early investigator of the airline 
industry's pricing policy; he studied how decisions were made by 
airline management under the regulatory control of the CAB. He 
maintained that the industry competed by offering more services; 
these services were defined as modern aircraft equipment, ground 
services (baggage and reservation systems), scheduling, inflight 
amenities, and marketing. However, the airlines would compete 
primarily by offering more flights and larger aircraft. Therefore, the 
average load factor would be adversely affected, due to the airlines' 
increased capacity. This important comparison of flight frequency to 
load factor continued to be advanced and tested by other 
researchers. 
Meyer, Peck, Zwick, & Stenason (1959) also questioned if the 
regulatory environment had outlived its usefulness. They arrived at 
three overlapping conclusions: (1) all transportation activities were 
becoming increasingly competitive, due to technological changes; (2) 
competition made government regulation extremely cumbersome 
and outdated, and; (3) regulatory insistence on highly uneconomical 
cross-subsidies was not justified since they endangered the survival 
of otherwise economical routes. 
Caves (1962) also studied the effects of regulation on 
competition. He found that the CAB, by allowing entry into markets, 
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reduced overall concentration among the trunks. The largest earners 
were operating in these markets, and the new entry eroded the 
trunks' market share. 
Caves also studied pnce and income elasticity demands. Price 
elasticity greatly affected a carrier's decisions on cooperating with 
other firms in the industry. If the demand price was found to be 
inelastic, then all the carriers benefited by cooperating, since they 
could raise profits. Caves also concluded that price elasticity should 
decline as the flight distance increased, resulting in more cooperation 
among the carriers on longer trips. 
Caves concluded that price elasticity was higher for business 
customers and lower for tourist class; therefore carriers would 
benefit more by moderate growth than by cooperation and slower 
growth. He also studied airline costs, suggesting that economies-of-
scale were not a factor for the major carriers, concluding there was 
no cost advantage to being a large firm in the industry. 
Jordan's (1970) study compared the regulated trunk airline 
industry in California to the unregulated intrastate airlines' 
performance also operating in California. Studying the data gathered 
from 1946 to 1965, he found the CAB was extremely effective in 
controlling pricing and market entry, often protecting the trunklines 
by allowing mergers and transfer of assets to keep them financially 
sound. However, unregulated prices were as much as 47% lower in 
the California markets. Like Caves, Jordan found that economies-of-
scale were realized only with small output levels. Since the industry 
operated on the principle of constant returns to scale, airlines would 
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be under constant threat of new earners if price or profits were 
excessively high in an unregulated market. 
Since route entry was controlled, the carriers competed by 
offering a higher quality of service; the price and service 
combination was usually higher than most consumers wanted. He 
further stated that consumers were required to purchase higher 
quality service, even though they wanted lower quality service at a 
lower price. Therefore, Jordan concluded that regulation was not in 
the consumer's best interest. 
Keeler (1972) maintained that Caves' conclusions regarding the 
effects of CAB regulation were ambiguous. Caves simultaneously 
stated that deregulation would bring about no improvement in 
market performance, while also stating that deregulation of high-
density routes was desirable. While Jordan's conclusions were not 
ambiguous, Keeler declared inaccuracies existed in Jordan's study, 
due to his analysis of cost structure. The Northeast Corridor cost 
structure for airlines might be completely different from the 
unregulated cost structures of the California airlines. If the cost 
structure was higher in the Northeast Corridor, then Jordan's 
estimate of regulation inefficiencies would be over-estimated and 
therefore invalid. Additionally, Jordan did not include any long-haul 
costs in his study, only speculating what these fares might be. 
The purpose of Keeler's study was "to estimate hypothetical 
unregulated fares on the 30 highest-density trunk airline routes m 
the United States"(p. 400). To estimate unregulated fares, cost 
functions would first need to be estimated and verified using 
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interstate airline data. His estimate of the total cost function 
· included two categories, direct cost and indirect cost. 
Direct cost included expenses for aircraft capital investment, 
crew salaries, fuel and aircraft cost and maintenance. Indirect costs 
included expenses for ground services ( cabin service, fuel), ticket 
sales and reservations, and administrative costs. To compute costs, 
Keeler used three aircraft types (DC-9s for short-, B-727s for 
medium-, and DC-8s for long-haul routes), an average load factor of 
50% (the normal load for the Pacific Southwest, which operated only 
in unregulated California markets) and a 12% return on investment 
with no depreciation. 
Keeler predicted airline fares for two intrastate (unregulated) 
California markets from his cost estimates; his predicted fares were 
similar to actual fares, thereby confirming his cost model. He then 
calculated fares for the thirty trunk markets and then determined 
the percentage of markup for regulated fares. He found markups of 
20% to 95% in 1968, and markups of 45% to 84% in 1972, with less 
correlation between markup and distance. 
Douglas and Miller ( 197 4) studied the impact of regulation on 
economic efficiency for the trunklines. They looked at two aspects of 
economic performance: technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. 
Technical efficiency requires that a firm appropriately select and 
combine inputs to produce a given output at its lowest total cost. 
Allocative efficiency measures whether the product offered reflects 
the consumer's desires. To evaluate technical efficiency, Douglas and 
Miller reviewed the cost of producing scheduled passenger air 
service. 
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Airline costs can be divided into three groups: capacity costs, 
traffic costs, and overhead costs. Capacity costs are those costs 
associated with generating capacity on an airline and include such 
things as aircraft operating costs and aircraft ownership costs. 
Capacity is measured in available-seat-miles and account for 
approximately 75% of total costs. Capacity cost does not vary with 
the volume of passengers. 
Factors affecting capacity cost are new aircraft technology, 
aircraft size and crew costs, flight distance, and the total aircraft 
flight time. Aircraft technology has changed greatly, especially since 
the introduction of jet service in the 1960s. As aircraft technology 
has progressed, capacity cost per seat has declined. The researchers 
also found economies-of-scale to be associated with aircraft size and 
flight distance, but not by the size of the individual airline. As 
aircraft size increases, capacity costs are spread over more seats, 
creating economies-of-scale. 
Traffic costs are those costs that vary directly with the volume 
of passengers and include baggage handling and the costs of 
processing passengers at the terminal. These traffic costs combine 
for approximately 20% of total cost. The remaining cost then 1s 
overhead cost, which is a relatively small part of total cost. 
Patterns of demand during the day, week, month, and year, 
and the ensuing pricing problems were studied; it was determined 
that peak pricing is not employed. In the peak periods, the 
opportunity costs to the airline are higher and thus price should 
reflect these additional costs. Douglas and Miller reported that 
demand was both income elastic and price elastic. 
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The CAB indirectly regulates service by dictating the rate of 
return and fares. The CAB will designate fares to produce a given 
rate of return. Airline operations under regulation will operate at 
the breakeven load factor. If the load factor rises above this level, 
profits will rise and firms will schedule more capacity (flights) until 
load factor declines to the breakeven level. This excess causes 
carriers to accept price structures and compete primarily on capacity. 
Under regulation, there are few incentives for the airlines to 
keep costs down. Typically, the industry passes on higher operating 
costs to the consumer rather than becoming more cost efficient. 
Although the industry will charge higher fares, in the long run, they 
will operate at zero economic profits. 
One major problem is that the CAB does not consider marginal 
cost when setting price. The CAB sets fares below marginal cost on 
short-haul markets. To offset the these losses, the CAB allows the 
long-haul markets to price above their marginal cost. 
Douglas & Miller conclude by stating that the overall level of 
airline fares is inefficient and leads to a price-quality combination 
much higher than most consumers want. The principle source of this 




THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978 
An Overview of Congressional Arguments For 
and Against Airline Deregulation 
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) increased the airline 
industry's freedom from government control over its economic 
activities. In enacting this legislation, Congress hoped to ensure a 
more competitive environment for American air carriers; however, 
the measure did not pass without controversy. The numerous 
Congressional debates and hearings that led up to the Act's passage 
produced a· variety of opinions on whether the airlines, their 
passengers, and the American economy would indeed benefit by 
deregulation (Lynch, 1984; Kwon, 1991). 
Alfred E. Kahn, chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, was a 
highly visible proponent for the passage of the ADA, speaking out 
enthusiastically for free competition. Testifying before Congress, he 
portrayed the CAB as "a firm advocate of loosening the tight grip of 
Government on the aviation industry and moving it in the direction 
II of restoring it to the control of a more competitive market . 
(Committee on Budget, 1977, p. 8). Believing less government 
intervention was better for the public, Kahn based his advocacy of 
competition upon the general principle of free enterprise, asserting 
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that ". . . growmg markets, expanding markets under the pressure of 
competition - have been beneficial to all parts of the economy" 
(Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 1978, p. 132). 
Kahn drew on his economics and public administration 
background in order to address the objections raised against 
deregulation; his study and experience in economic matters 
convinced him that the public interest was best served by 
competition, not regulation. He asserted that competition served the 
public interest because it "is the only persistently effective 
mechanism available to us for holding costs and prices in check, and 
for stimulating cost, price, and service innovations" (Committee on 
Public Works and Transportation, 1978, p. 71). 
Kahn divided his proposal for competition into two sections: 
substantive and procedural. The substantive section centered 
exclusively on the "automatic entry provision" as an essential 
program to encourage free competition. This system allowed each 
individual carrier to move into a limited number of markets on the 
basis of its own judgment; due to the ease of entry, new carriers 
would create price and service competition. In his procedural 
section, Kahn expressed the desire to move quickly in the 
competitive direction (Kwon, 1991 ). Even though it was expected 
that the development of new routes and fares might be more 
difficult and complicated, he wanted to establish unrestricted 
competition in the airline industry, asserting: 
We (the CAB) intend to proceed in a phased and orderly 
fashion to move from the present program . . to the new 
program. That is why we have requested a seven-year 
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transition. . . at the end of the seven-year period, each of 
the carriers will have an opportunity to complete the 
transition to full-fledged trunkline status (Committee on 
Public Works and Transportation, 1978, p. 111). 
The CAB chairman was a strong believer in free competition, 
pointing out the eventual benefits for the companies, their 
employees, stockholders, and creditors. He believed with fewer 
regulations organizing the market, the airlines would face the 
challenge of achieving productivity and profits based on effective 
management and efficient innovations. Kahn asserted that the 
achievement of these goals by airline executives would ensure the 
ongoing growth of private business in the industry and concluded 
that low fares, derived from more competition, would create a higher 
demand for air travel (Kwon, 1991). 
However, most of the established big airlines did not favor 
deregulation. They argued that the changes and the pressure of 
increased competition would result in unfavorable consequences. 
American Airlines' chairman and president, Albert V. Casey, asserted 
that no further · competition was required because of the high level 
already established. He maintained that the effect of additional 
competition would increase neither revenues nor profits and 
believed that the severe competition faced through deregulation 
would not guarantee profits. Casey further stated that the effects of 
deregulation would lead to financial instability and perhaps even 
chaos, adding that: 
Once you take the dangerous step of putting the new 
regulatory concepts into play; there will be little 
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opportunity to turn back .... There will be service 
complaints, cries for Federal subsidies, appeals for job 
protection measures, and searches for new ways to 
control rising fares" (Committee on Public Works and 
Transportation, 1977, p. 1187). 
Others shared the view that the deregulation bill might contain 
serious, hidden flaws. Some members of Congress and the industry 
believed that excessive competition might lessen service to more 
marginal markets and small communities, enlarge industry 
concentration, force reduced opportunity for new entrants, harm 
smaller carriers and the weak members of large trunk lines, and 
induce fare increases on less-populated routes (Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 1978). 
As the ADA was being drafted, Congress realized the Act could 
either free the industry from stifling regulation or destroy it. The 
Congress sought to address these concerns in the Act so the bill 
would foster a beneficial environment for the industry and 
consumers alike. 
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 
Overview of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1978) amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1958), providing legislation toward the 
public interest, convemence, and necessity and away from the 
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protection of the industry. As this transition took place, its creators 
aimed to ensure that safety would remain the top priority in air 
transportation, assigning this responsibility to the Secretary of 
Transportation. Safety implications of new services and a full 
evaluation thereof were required prior to the authorization of new 
air transportation services. Rigid safety procedures were established 
to ensure no degradation of established airline safety records. The 
Act recognized the clear intent, encouragement, and dedication of the 
U.S. Congress to continue the highest degree of safety in air 
transportation and air commerce while maintaining the safety 
vigilance that had evolved within the airline industry arid had come 
to be expected by the traveling public. 
After ensuring safe travel, the Act concentrated on maintaining 
adequate, efficient, and low-cost service to the traveling public. This 
focus was to be accomplished by maximum use of competitive 
market forces to provide a balanced national air transportation 
system, with efficient carriers who could earn profits. The Act 
prevented unfair, predatory, or anti-competitive practices by 
allowing the market to prevent monopolies, unreasonable price 
increases, or reduced services in air transportation. 
The Act encouraged entry into air transportation markets by 
new carriers and enticed established carriers to enter additional 
markets. It also provided for the continued strengthening of small 
carriers to assure a more effective, competitive airline industry. The 
Act sought the encouragement, development, and maintenance of an 
air transportation system, relying on actual and potential 
competition. This reliance would provide efficiency, innovation, and 
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low pnce, and it would allow public input to help determine the 
variety, quality, and price of air transportation services (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1978). 
Loss of service to small communities was of great concern; 
therefore the Act provided for the maintenance of a comprehensive 
and convenient system of continuous scheduled airline service for 
these communities and other isolated areas, with direct Federal 
assistance where appropriate. At major urban areas, the Act sought 
use of secondary or satellite airports to allow more carriers access to 
the larger cities. This added service was encouraged where 
consistent with regional airport plans and when such encouragement 
was endorsed by appropriate State entities. These agencies 
encouraged services by air carriers whose sole responsibility was to 
provide service exclusively at the secondary and satellite airports. 
Finally, the Act developed and maintained a sound regulatory 
environment responsive to the needs of the public. Decisions were to 
be reached promptly, in order to facilitate adaptation of the air 
transportation system to the present and future needs of the United 
States, the Postal Service, and the national defense (U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1978). 
Safety Study 
Congress insisted that implementation of the Airline 
Deregulation Act result in no diminution of the high standard of 
safety in air transportation attained in the United States at the time 
of its enactment. The Secretary of Transportation was instructed to 
prepare and submit a report to Congress and the Board, not later 
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than January 31, 1980, and each January 31 thereafter. This report 
would be a comprehensive annual analysis of the extent to which the 
implementation of the ADA had affected, during the preceding 
calendar year, or will affect, in the succeeding calendar year, the 
level of air safety. 
The Act dictates that each report contain a detailed analysis: 
( 1) All relevant data on air transportation accidents 
and incidents occurring during the previous year 
will be included. 
(2) All relevant data on violations of safety regulations 
issued by the Secretary of Transportation occurring 
during the previous year will be outlined. 
(3) The effects of changes on current levels of air 
safety or proposals for changes in airline operating 
practices and procedures will be discussed. 
( 4) The adequacy of current air safety regulations will 
be evaluated, emphasizing changes in airline 
operating practices and procedures which occurred 
during the previous year. 
Based on this report, the Secretary of Transportation 1s 
instructed to take those steps necessary to ensure the highest 
standard of safety in air transportation. The Secretary shall 
continually modify safety regulations, as necessary, to prevent any 
potential conflict of safety interest (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1978). 
The CAB is given the authority to oversee commuter operations. 
The Board must determine that a commuter air carrier is fit, willing, 
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and able to perform such service, and the aircraft used and all 
operations will conform to the safety standards established by the 
Administrator. Not later than the 180th day after the Act takes 
effect, the Administrator will establish safety standards for 
commuter aircraft and their operations. Such safety standards will 
become effective within 18 months. Furthermore, the Administrator 
will ensure that the level of safety provided to persons traveling on 
commuter air carriers is, to the maximum feasible extent, equivalent 
to the level of safety provided to persons traveling on major air 
carriers. 
Route Applications 
When any carrier files a route application, the Board 1s given 90 
days to: (a) set such application for a public hearing; (b) begin to 
make a determination on the application under the simplified 
procedures established by the Board, or; (c) dismiss the application. 
Any person may file a letter of opposition to or support of the 
issuance of the route application. Any order of dismissal without 
setting the application f o~ hearing, or beginning to make a 
determination with respect to such application under the simplified 
procedures, will be deemed a final order, subject to judicial review. 
If the Board determines that an application should be set for a 
public hearing, an initial or recommended decision will be issued not 
later than 150 days after the date of such determination by the 
Board. The Board must make its final decision within 90 days of the 
issuance of the initial or recommended decision. If the Board does 
not act within the 90-day period, the initial or recommended 
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decision becomes the final decision of the Board and is subject to 
judicial review; the Board's final order will be issued under the 
simplified procedures within 180 days (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1978). 
The Act simplified the process of issuing new route certificates. 
It directs the Board to issue a certificate if it finds that the applicant 
1s fit, willing and able to perform the transportation properly and can 
conform to the provisions of the ADA. The applicant must abide by 
the rules, regulations, and requirements of the Board, and such 
transportation must be deemed consistent with the public convenient 
and necessity. These requirements apply to all applicants in all 
situations. 
In the case of an application for a certificate to engage in 
temporary air transportation, the Board may issue a certificate 
authorizing the application for limited periods as is consistent with 
the aforementioned requirements of public convenience and 
necessity. In the case of an application for a certificate to engage m 
charter air transportation, the Board may issue a certificate to any 
applicant not licensed as an air carrier on January 1, 1977. 
Unused authority (routes certificated but not used) was defined 
m the Act, and the Board was directed to release these routes to 
other carriers. Any air carrier authorized to provide round-trip 
service nonstop between any 2 points in the continental U.S. must 
provide a minimum of 5 round trips per week for at least 13 weeks 
during any 26-week period. If the air carrier fails to provide such 
service as published in flight schedules (a minimum of five round 
trips per week) and is the only air carrier providing this scheduled 
62 
service, then the Board must issue a certificate to the first applicant 
who, within 30 days after the last day of the 26-week period, 
submits an application for that route. If two or more carriers 
provide the nonstop service, the Board will issue a certificate to the 
first applicant who, within 30 days, submits an application. Seasonal 
routes, those that operate only during specified times of the year, are 
likewise treated (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978). 
The Act requires the Board to issue a final order granting the 
certificate within 60 days of the date of the application, unless it is 
found that the issuance of a certificate is inconsistent with the 
requirement of public convenience and necessity. Prior to issuing 
such final order, the Board is directed to give adequate notice and 
opportunity for interested persons to file appropriate written 
evidence and argument, but the Board does not need to hold oral 
evidentiary hearings. For any application covering an unused 
authority, it is presumed that any transportation covered by an 
application for a certificate is consistent with the public convenience 
and necessity. 
Whenever the Board issues a new permanent certificate, the air 
carrier receiving such certificate must commence the new service 
within 45 days. If the air carrier fails to commence service within 
the allowed 45-day period, the Board will revoke the new certificate. 
Whenever the Board issues a temporary certificate, the air earner 
receiving this certificate must commence service within 15 days 
after the beginning of the requested season, otherwise the certificate 
will be revoked. 
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When a carrier fails to provide service to a given point, the 
Board will issue only one new certificate to cover that route. At that 
time, the Board will suspend the authority of the first air carrier to 
provide that service (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978). 
Automatic entry into new markets became allowed under the 
ADA. Between January 1 and 12 of each of the calendar years 1979, 
1980, and 1981, any carrier that had operated during the preceding 
calendar year may apply to the Board for a certificate to engage in a 
new, nonstop service. This new service can be between any one pair 
of points in interstate air transportation, in addition to any pair of 
points already authorized. A carrier may apply for new, nonstop 
service between any two points; however, each carrier can protect 
one market pair from new entry by other carriers. Within 60 days 
of this application, the Board must issue a certificate to the applicant 
for the nonstop service specified in the application. This issuance is 
automatic, unless the applicant does not fulfill the requirements of 
being fit, willing, and able. 
Not later than the 120th day of calendar years 1979, 1980, and 
1981, any air carrier which submitted an application to the Board 
and: (a) did not receive a certificate to provide service between the 
pair of points set forth in the application, or; (b) received a certificate 
to provide service between the pair of points, but was not the only 
air carrier to receive one, may reapply to the Board. The carrier may 
submit a request for a certificate to engage in nonstop service 
between any one pair of points ( other than the cities specified m the 
first application), in addition to those authorized by an existing 
certificate. However, no air carrier may apply to engage in nonstop 
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service between such pair of points if another air carrier has filed 
written notice to the Board with respect to the same pair of points. 
Not later than the 60th day after the date on which the Board 
receives an application, the Board shall issue a certificate to the 
applicant for such nonstop service (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1978). 
Any air carrier which is authorized to engage in nonstop service 
between any pair of points in interstate air transportation on the 
first business day of calendar year 1979, 1980, or 1981 can preclude 
any other air carrier from obtaining authority to engage in nonstop 
service between such pair of points. At this time, the carrier may 
file written notice to the Board naming these points. Upon receipt of 
written notice, the Board makes this notice available to the public. 
To prevent a sudden disruption in service, the ADA states that 
no air carrier can terminate or suspend all air transportation its 
providing to a point, or reduce the air transportation below which 
the Board has determined to be essential air transportation. If the 
air carrier adversely changes its service to a point, it must give the 
Board, any community affected, and any appropriate State agencies 
in the community at least 90 days' notice of its intent to terminate, 
suspend, or reduce such air transportation. 
Likewise, air carriers may not change any rate, fare, or charge, 
or any classification, rule, regulation, or practice affecting the same, 
until 30 days after notice of the proposed change has been filed, 
posted, and published. However, if the effect of any proposed tariff 
change would be to institute a fare that is outside of the applicable 
range of fares specified in the Act, the proposed change can not be 
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implemented, except after 60 days' notice (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1978). 
The ADA also addresses the issue of compensation for the 
transportation of mail. It determines that the rate paid must be 
sufficient to ensure the performance of such service. Compensation 
shall reflect the carrier's capability to provide honest·, economical, 
and efficient service and to maintain the same level of quality as 
previously provided. The mail compensation must also allow the 
carrier to maintain and continue the development of air 
transportation to the extent and of the character and quality 
required for the commerce of the United States, the Postal Service, 
and the national defense. Compensation rates paid to any carriers 
shall be based on its subsidy need, calculated with respect to service 
performed. 
Mergers and mutual aid agreements were addressed by the ADA 
to ensure competition in service and pricing remained at the center 
of deregulation. If any air carrier wishes to consolidate, merge with, 
purchase, lease, or acqmre another earner, it must first notify the 
Board. After a hearing, if the Board finds that the transaction will be 
consistent with the public interest, it will approve the transaction. 
However, the Board will not approve this transaction if it results in a 
monopoly or a substantial lessening of competition in that region. 
The Board may approve a transaction that produces a monopoly or 
reduces competition, if it finds that the anti-competitive effects of 
the proposed transaction are outweighed by the public interest. This 
approval will occur if the applicant shows that consumer needs may 
not be satisfied by any available alternative. 
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Mutual aid agreements, which provide for payments from other 
air carriers during reduced levels of service due to a labor strike, are 
no longer approved. Furthermore, no air carrier is allowed to enter 
into any new mutual aid agreement, unless the air carrier files a 
copy of such agreement with the Board and the Board approves it. 
The Board is directed not to approve any mutual aid agreement, 
unless specifically stated that the benefits are not payable for more 
than two months and benefits may not be for losses incurred during 
the first month of a labor strike. Moreover, any carrier participating 
in an agreement must submit the debated issues to binding 
arbitration under the Railway Labor Act (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1978). 
Service to small communities is guaranteed by the ADA. The 
ADA defines "essential air transportation" as scheduled air 
transportation to points designated by the Board that satisfies the 
needs of the communities involved. This transportation must ensure 
access to the nation's air system at rates, fares, and charges which 
are not unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory, preferential, or 
prejudicial. The transportation must be at least two daily round 
trips, five days per week, or the level of service provided by air 
carriers to that point for calendar year 1977, whichever is less. The 
essential air transportation section is in effect for ten years from the 
date of passage of the Act. 
The term "eligible point" means any point m the United States 
which ( a) a carrier is providing service to, or (b) has lost air carrier 
service between July 1, 1968, and the date of passage of the Act. 
The Board will establish objective criteria for designating points as 
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eligible and may also specify any point m the state of Alaska or 
Hawaii as eligible. When considering eligible points, the Board shall 
consider: (a) the level of traffic generated by the point; (b) its future 
traffic generating potential; ( c) the cost to the Federal Government of 
providing essential air transportation; (d) any alternate means of 
transportation available to residents of the communities of interest, 
and; (e) the views of any interested community and the State 
agencies in which such community is located. 
After January 1, 1982, the Board may designate any point an 
eligible point, but only if this designation will not increase the total 
number of points above that receiving a subsidy on July 1, 1968. 
The designation of any point as eligible may be withdrawn, if the 
point no longer meets the criteria (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1978). 
An air carrier that holds a certificate, whether or not rece1vmg 
compensation for service to that eligible point, may not terminate, 
suspend, or reduce air transportation established by the Board. If a 
carrier desires to decrease service to an eligible point, it must give 
the Board, the appropriate State agencies, and the communities 
affected at least 90 days' notice prior to such termination, 
suspension, or reduction. 
If the Board determines that compensation is required to 
provide essential air transportation, then it will announce the eligible 
points and establish the amount of compensation to be paid for 
providing such essential air transportation. In selecting an applicant 
to provide essential air transportation, the Board will consider the 
desirability of developing an integrated linear system of air 
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transportation and the experience of the applicant m providing 
scheduled air service. 
After the eligible routes are awarded, the Board makes 
payments of compensation at times and in a manner determined to 
be appropriate. The Board continues to compensate any air carrier to 
provide essential air transportation to any eligible point, but only for 
as long as the Board deems necessary (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1978). 
If an air carrier notifies the Board of its intention to suspend, 
terminate, or reduce service to any eligible point below the level of 
essential air transportation, the Board will seek new air carriers for 
that point. If no new carriers are found, the Board will reqmre the 
original carrier to continue such service to such point for an 
additional 30-day period, or until another carrier can be found, 
whichever first occurs. The Board will continue this system as 
necessary to ensure air transportation to such eligible point. In this 
situation, the air carrier would continue to receive compensation (if 
previously compensated, or begin receiving compensation, if 
appropriate) until the Board finds another air carrier to provide 
essential air transportation to that point. 
Finally, the Board will periodically review the determination of 
what is essential air transportation to what eligible point. The Board 
may, based upon such review and consultations with any interested 
community and any appropriate State agencies, make appropriate 
adjustments as to what is essential air transportation to such point. 
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Rates 
On July 1, 1977 the "standard industry fare level" (SIFL) set the 
fare level for each interstate pair of points and each class of service. 
The ADA dictates that the Board at least semi-annually adjust each 
SIFL, increasing or decreasing it by the percentage change in the 
actual operating cost per available seat-mile. 
The Board no longer has authority to find any fare unjust or 
unreasonable, except in unusual circumstances. Fare changes will not 
be subject to review if the fare increase is not more than 5% above or 
50% below the SIFL for the same class of service. If the proposed 
fare change is above the 5% limit, then the rate will usually be 
disallowed on the basis that it was unduly preferential, unduly 
prejudicial, or unjustly discriminatory. Any fare request below the 
50% limit will normally not be granted, as deemed predatory by the 
ADA (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978). 
In determining whether any fare request is unjust or 
unreasonable on the basis that it is too high, the Board will consider 
reasonably estimated or foreseeable future costs and revenues 
during which the requested fare may be in effect. By July 1, 1979, 
the Board must issue regulations modifying the rules governing those 
classes of service in existence on July 1, 1977. These regulations also 
apply to classes providing lower fare levels during off-peak periods. 
The Board will also allow any carrier to establish additional classes of 
service shown to be consistent with the public interest. If a 
complaint is filed alleging that a fare is discriminatory or predatory, 
then the Board will act on the complaint within 90 days. 
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In determining rates, fares, and charges, the Board considers the 
need for adequate and efficient transportation at the lowest cost, 
consistent with the furnishing of such service. It should also 
determine the effect of a variety of price and service options in 
response to particular competitive market conditions, such as peak 
and off-peak pricing. 
Sunset Provisions 
The Airline Deregulation Act included provisions for the 
termination and transfer of the authority of the CAB. On December 
31, 1981, the CAB ended its authority to issue certificates, approve 
service terminations, reductions, and suspensions (except essential 
air transportation). The sections governing tariff changes and rates 
were terminated on January 1, 1983 (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1978). 
The ADA also decided to transfer authority of areas that 
continued to function. The first area transferred was mergers, which 
went to the Department of Transportation on January 1, 1983. In 
January, 1985, authority to provide compensation for air 
transportation to small communities was transferred to the 
Department of Transportation. Simultaneously, authority for the 
determination of rates for the carnage of mails in air transportation 
was given to the Postal Service. 
As a final procedure, the Board was directed to submit to 
Congress by January, 1984, a comprehensive review of the Board's 
implementation of the provisions of the Act. The report was to cover 
accomplishments during the initial period of the Act's existence, 
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along with a comprehensive review of each of the Board's programs. 
The comprehensive review would include a detailed comparison of 
the degree of completion of the programs within the Act as well as a 
comparison of the degree of pricing competition within the industry. 
The report was to discuss the extent of unused authority and provide 
a comparison of the extent of air transportation service provided to 
small communities, together with facts detailing the comparative 
subsidy costs. Finally, the report was to assess the impact of these 
changes on the national air transportation system and give the 
Board's opm10n as to whether these changes have improved or 
harmed this nation's domestic air transportation system. This 
assessment was to include a detailed opinion from the Board as to 
whether the public interest required continuation of the Board and 
its functions beyond January 1, 1985. 
Summary 
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was designed first to relax, 
and then to terminate, direct economic control of the domestic airline 
industry. This change was to ensure a gradual deregulation of the 
airline industry. The CAB was scheduled for termination in 1985, 
following a gradual transition period in which its regulatory 
functions were either terminated or transferred to other government 
agencies. 
During this transition period, the Civil Aeronautics Board was 
directed to ". . . stress competition and to encourage low fare service 
and new entry into the industry" (U.S. Congress, 1978a, p. 3740). Its 
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authority to regulate airline market entry, exit, and fares was 
diminished, and procedures to expedite Board decisions were 
established. 
The established restrictions on entry of new airlines into 
scheduled passenger service and controls over established carrier 
entry into new routes were greatly reduced. Though still required to 
obtain a certificate, a carrier must only prove that it was "fit, willing, 
and able" to provide the service; it no longer had to show that it was 
"required by the public convenience and necessity." The Board was 
also now required to allow charter operators to provide scheduled 
passenger service. New route authority, an accelerated certification 
process, less stringent fitness standards, and a shift in the burden of 
proof to opponents of new entry greatly increased the ability of all 
air carriers to set their own destiny (Brown, 1987). 
Relaxed entry requirements were enhanced with unused 
authority and automatic entry programs that allowed earners to 
enter new routes without CAB interference. Under the unused 
authority provisions, carriers were allowed to provide nonstop flights 
on routes where other carriers were certified but not providing 
nonstop service. The automatic entry program required the CAB to 
grant carriers at least one new route during the 1979, 1980, and 
1981 calendar years. 
Carriers were also granted more freedom to exit markets, 
requiring them only to give advance notice and allowing them to 
bypass lengthy evidentiary hearings before terminating service. The 
only restriction placed on exit from a market was the requirement 
that "essential air transportation" be maintained at selected cities. 
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This restriction included all cities rece1vmg scheduled passenger 
service before passage of the Act. The essential air transportation 
program was included to prevent abrupt termination of service on 
less profitable routes to smaller communities. The Board was 
directed to define the requirements for essential service to small 
communities. This service was guaranteed for ten years and funded 
by a new subsidy program. If a replacement carrier could not be 
found, the Board would deny a carrier's request to exit that market. 
The Board was authorized to subsidize the original carrier for any 
losses on that route, thereby guaranteeing essential air service to the 
communities (Brown, 1987). 
Pricing freedom was a major goal of the Act. Even though an 
upper and lower limit on pricing flexibility was set, the airlines had a 
major input in determining fares for their markets. The Board 
determined, and periodically revised, a standard industry fare level 
(SIFL). Rate adjustments not greater than 5% above of 50% below 
the SIFL were automatically granted, unless they were found to be 
predatory. 
The Board's authority to provide antitrust exemption was 
amended. Under the old law, Board approval was required for all 
inter-carrier agreements regarding mergers and mutual aid 
agreements. In the past, Board approval exempted carriers from 
prosecution under the antitrust laws. Inter-carrier agreements still 
required Board approval, but the Act limited Board discretion by 
directing it to apply the pro-competitive thrust of antitrust statutes 
in immunity decisions. Also, the Board was prohibited from 
approving an agreement which substantially reduced or eliminated 
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competition, unless the earner could prove a senous transportation 
need or an important public benefit. Finally, the Board could not 
approve any agreement that limited capacity or fixed rates, fares, or 
charges (Brown, 1987). 
During the transition period, the maJor components of the old 
regulatory framework were terminated. Regulation of carrier routes 
stopped on December 31, 1981. On January 1, 1983, all regulation of 
fares and mergers ended. Finally, the CAB presented a detailed 
opinion to Congress as to whether the Board and its functions should 
be continued beyond January, 1985. 
After its termination on January 1, 1985, the CAB's 
responsibilities were transferred to other governmental agencies. 
The Department of Transportation assumed responsibility for 
essential air transportation. The Justice Department assumed control 
of the antitrust authority, and the Postal Service oversaw 
responsibilities regarding mail transport. 
The Airline Deregulation Act was designed to mcrease the airline 
industry's freedom from government control over its economic 
activities. By passing this legislation, Congress hoped to ensure a 
more competitive environment for American air carriers. Some 
members of Congress and the industry believed that excessive 
competition from deregulation might be disastrous. They feared loss 
of service to small communities, fare increases on less-populated 
routes, and a decrease in safety for airline travelers. 
The ADA addressed these concerns. Safety, its first priority, was 
not to be compromised at any level. The Act relaxed restrictions on 
route entry and pricing, and guaranteed service to small 
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communities for at least ten years. Moreover, the ADA allowed 
charter and supplemental carriers the chance to acquire major routes 
and expand their operations. The Act's gradualism approach was 




SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The purpose of the study was to investigate the history of U.S. 
airline regulation. There were three basic aspects of this study. 
Specifically, it sought to: (a) investigate regulation prior to 1978, (b) 
examine conclusions of studies conducted referencing this era, and; 
( c) describe the issues addressed by the passage of the ADA. 
A review of the literature revealed that the government has 
played an active role throughout the history of the airline industry. 
The history prior to deregulation provides insight into the effect of 
regulation on air travel. 
The fitst major legislation, the Air Mail Act (U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1925), encouraged commercial aviation by 
transferring the movement of mail from the Army to private 
earners. Congress continued to encourage aviation through the Air 
Commerce Act (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1926), providing 
funds for ground facilities, along with airway and navigational aides. 
Abuses of the Air Mail Act led to awarding air mail contracts based 
on competitive bids. Direct and indirect subsidies were provided to 
the airlines, and the Interstate Commerce Commission was then 
authorized to govern passenger fares. 
77 
78 
In January, 1935, the Federal Aviation Commission 
recommended to Congress the establishment of a separate regulatory 
agency. The airlines and the Air Transport Association were also in 
favor of one governing agency to oversee the airline industry. The 
government agreed that their heavy investment in the airline 
industry was threatened by unrestricted competition; accordingly, 
they enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. 
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1938) was the most important piece of legislation prior to 
deregulation. This Act established the Civil Aeronautics Authority, a 
five-member board, to guide the airline industry. Their goal was to 
regulate, promote, and develop the air transportation system. They 
oversaw three major elements: control of entry and competition, 
control of earning and fares, and control of safety (Van Scyoc, 1987). 
This Act established the regulatory framework that would rule the 
airline industry until 1978. 
In 1940, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was established to 
take over the i-esponsibilities of the CAA. The Board was given 
authority over economic activities, such as commercial airline routing 
and pricing practices (Kwon, 1991). 
The CAB's focus changed during World War II. Since profits 
were extremely high, public pressure shifted the focus from 
competition to the industry's fare structure. This emphasis 
culminated in the introduction of the coach fare (Caves, 1962). The 
CAB also instituted feeder airlines for service to small communities. 
Concurrently, supplemental (nonscheduled) airlines were allowed to 
operate, offering charter operations, military support, and low-fare 
flights. 
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After the Korean Conflict, earnmgs improved significantly, 
drawing attention to very high profits. A Congressional investigation 
resulted in the passage of the General Passenger Fare Investigation 
(GPFI), which created a fair rate of return policy. 
The Federal Aviation Act (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958) 
created the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) to replace the Civil 
Aeronautics Administration and assume its functions. The new FAA 
assumed two major areas: (1) they were given full responsibility 
and authority for the advancement and enforcement of civil 
aeronautics, including all safety regulations, and; (2) they assumed 
full responsibility for management of the national airspace system. 
This responsibility included enforcement of air traffic rules, and 
development and operation of air-navigation facilities. The Civil 
Aeronautics Board, however, continued its jurisdiction over the 
investigation of air accidents. 
The late 1960s saw increasing competition among the airlines. 
Although prices were fixed, frequency of flights and capacity levels 
were not. The airlines flew with high frequency and low load factors. 
This situation prompted the CAB to initiate the Domestic Passenger 
Fare Investigation (DPFI), providing the Board's first analysis of its 
fare policies (Bailey, Graham & Kaplan, 1985). The DPFI enhanced 
the policies of the GPFI and instituted a formula using load factors 
for determining fares. 
The 1970s saw growing public sympathy toward deregulation 
(Doganis, 1985; Caves & Roberts, 1975). In February, 1975, the 
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and 
Procedure began investigations into the fairness and effectiveness of 
. CAB practices and procedures. Later that year, the Ford 
Administration proposed the Aviation Act of 1975 (U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1975), which was aimed at stimulating price 
competition, eliminating entry barriers to new markets, and altering 
the basic function and purpose of the CAB. 
In June, 1977, Alfred E. Kahn was appointed chairman of the 
Civil Aeronautics Board. A highly visible proponent of deregulation, 
he was an aggressive spokesman for free competition. 
Kahn continued his support for deregulation and offered plans 
for its inception. He proposed a gradual phasing out of the 
regulatory environment, in order to ensure an orderly transition 
from regulation to deregulation. His plan envisioned freedom from 
route and pricing restrictions which the CAB had controlled for 40 
years. 
Others feared that the deregulation bill might contain senous, 
hidden flaws, believing that excessive competition might diminish 
service to small communities, harm smaller carriers, and induce fare 
increases on less-populated routes (Committee on Commerce, Science, 
& Transportation, 1978). 
As the Act was drafted, Congress realized that these concerns 
were justified. They sought to address these concerns in the Act, in 
order for the bill to create a beneficial environment for the industry 
and consumers alike. 
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) increased the 
airline industry's freedom from government control. In enacting this 
legislation, Congress hoped to ensure a more competitive 
environment for American air carriers, while ensuring a safe, low-
cost fare for the American consumer. 
The ADA was designed first to relax, and then to terminate, 
direct economic control by the CAB. The CAB was scheduled for 
termination in 1985, following a gradual transition period in which 
its regulatory functions were either terminated or transferred to 
other government agencies. 
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During this transition period, the Civil Aeronautics Board was 
directed to rely on competitive market forces to further the industry. 
Its authority to regulate airline market entry, exit, and fares was 
diminished, and procedures to expedite Board decisions were 
established. Relaxed entry requirements were enhanced with 
unused authority and automatic entry programs that allowed 
carriers to enter new routes without CAB interference. 
Carriers were also granted more freedom to exit markets, 
requiring them only to give advance notice and allowing them to 
bypass lengthy evidentiary hearings before terminating service. The 
only restriction placed on exit from a market was the requirement 
that "essential air transportation" be maintained at selected cities. 
The essential air service program was added to prevent abrupt 
termination of service on less profitable routes to smaller 
communities. 
Pricing freedom was a maJor goal of the Act. Although an upper 
and lower limit on pricing flexibility was set, the airlines had a great 
deal of input in determining fares for their markets. 
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During the transition period, the major components of the old 
regulatory framework were terminated. Regulation of carrier routes 
ended on December 31, 1981. On January 1, 1983, all regulation of 
fares and mergers would terminate. Finally, the CAB was required to 
present a detailed opinion to Congress by January, 1984, as to 
whether the Board should continue beyond January, 1985. 
After its termination on January 1, 1985, the CAB's 
responsibilities were transferred to other governmental agencies. 
The Department of Transportation assumed responsibility for 
essential air transportation. The Justice Department assumed control 
of the antitrust authority and the Postal Service oversaw 
responsibilities regarding mail transport. 
Recommendations 
Research conducted for this study provides recommendations for 
further study in this area: 
1. Safety was a prime consideration of the Airline 
Deregulation Act. Prior to the passage of the ADA, the 
major airlines maintained an excellent safety record. 
Further research should be done to identify any 
significant changes in the safety standard of U.S. airlines 
since passage of the ADA. 
2. Consumer cost was a major factor which induced the 
ADA. The Act sought to ensure lower prices with 
satisfactory service for the American consumer. A study 
should be done to (a) compare consumer cost (in dollars) 
between the date of the Act's passage and the present, 
and (b) compare the frequency of flights/average load 
factors/airline earnings between the date of the Act's 
passage and the present. 
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3. Essential Air Transportation was designed to ensure 
service to small- and medium-sized communities. The 
service, however, was only guaranteed for ten years after 
passage of the ADA. Future studies should be done to 
determine the effects on the these communities after 
expiration of the ten-year requirement. 
4. The limitations of this study dealt specifically with U.S.-
based airlines. Future studies could be designed to 
examme the economic effects of foreign-based airlines 
entering the U.S. domestic system. 
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1961 - Merged with United 
1956 - Merged with Delta 
1956 - Acquired by Eastern 
1952 - Merged with Western 
1952 - Merged with Braniff 
1980 - Merged with Pan Am 
1971 - Merged with Delta 






Airline Subsidies 1943-1978 
(In thousands of dollars) 
YEAR LOCAL TRUNKLINEa TOTALh 
SERVICE 
1943 ------- 4,969 7,599 
1944 ------- 2,007 3,568 
1945 ------- 2,305 6,897 
1946 1,081 4,082 21,048 
1947 3,674 9,056 43,452 
1948 9,411 21,574 65,004 
1949 12,396 26,188 74,323 
1950 14,848 26,749 81,938 
1951 17,319 16,510 64,918 
1952 18,990 6,607 63,122 
1953 21,852 3,527 67,736 
1954 24,299 3,822 58,401 
1955 22,358 2,773 39,739 
1956 24,122 1,790 43,189 
1957 28,444 1,572 48,613 
1958 32,703 2,283 52,540 
1959 36,450 1,201 50,016 
1960 51,498 0 65,576 
1961 56,300 0 71,856 
1962 64,835 0 80,010 
1963 67,700 0 82,910 
1964 65,511 2,566 82,590 
1965 61,453 3,475 77,534 
1966 58,562 3,089 70,545 
1967 54,966 2,477 63,949 
1968 47,982 1,343 55,219 
1969 40,513 0 46,723 
1970 34,830 0 39,726 
1971 55,940 0 60,439 
1972 62,160 0 66,554 
1973 60,206 0 64,571 
1974 68,988 0 73,333 
1975 63,581 0 65,348 
1976 71,343 0 74,656 
1977 79,787 0 81,134 
1978 73 999 0 75 893 
98 
a/ Trunkline subsidies for 1964-1968 reflect payments to Northeast 
Airlines serving the New England area. 
b/ Total subsidies include trunkline, local, intra-state, helicopter and 
international operations. 
Sources: Civil Aeronautics Board, Subsidy for U.S. Certificated Air 
Carriers, 1943-1978. 
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APPENDIXC 
Domestic-Passenger-Coach Fare Structure 
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Terminal Charge Line-haul Charge 







1501 and over 
Source: Civil Aeronautics Board, Domestic Passenger Fare 
Investigation, Phase 9, 18 March 1974, p. 181. 
Appendix D 
MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE AVIATION ACT OF 1975 
101 
Major Provisions of the Aviation Act of 1975 
1. Policy Changes 
(a) the Declaration of Policy, enacted in 1938, is revised to 
stress the desirability of competition rather than protection of 
established carriers 
102 
(b) directs the Board to encourage the entry of new firms into 
au transportation. 
2. Pricing Flexibility 
(a) allows increased airline pncmg flexibility over a three year 
period 
(b) during the first year airlines may lower prices as much as 
40 percent; and by the third year, fare decreases will be allowed 
unless they are below the direct cost of service 
( c) fares may be increased up to 10 percent per year. 
3. Entry 
(a) all existing restrictions to route entry will be eliminated 
within the next five years 
(b) allows each earner to mcrease route mileage by about five 
percent per year 
(c) after January 1, 1978, a earner may sell, transfer or lease 
any portion of its operating authority to any air carrier found by the 
CAB to be fit, willing, and able to provide air service 
103 
(d) supplemental airlines may immediately apply for authority 
to provide scheduled service between cities not receiving such service 
from certificated carriers 
(e) reduces the strict limitations on charter services and allows 
commuter airlines to increase the size of aircraft they operate from 30 
to 35 seats. 
4. Abandonment of Service 
(a) carriers will be permitted to exit upon 90 days notice if 
alternative schedules air service 1s provided by another carrier 
(b) if alternate scheduled 'air service is not provided, carriers 
will be permitted to exit whenever, taking subsidies into account, they 
could not cover fully allocated costs for one year 
(c) he Board can require continued service if the community or 
another industry were willing to defray the carrier's losses. 
5. Subsidies 
(a) no change at this time 
(b) Secretary of transportation will study the current system 
and report to Congress within one year. 
6. Mergers 
(a) the Act brings airline merger standards m line with normal 
antitrust laws 
(b) the Board could not appJove a merger which would tend to 
create a monopoly or substantially lessen competition, unless unusual 
circumstances existed. 
104 
7. Anticompetitive Agreements 
the Act prohibits the Board from approvmg agreements that in 
any way control levels of capacity, equipment or schedules, or which 
relate to pooling or apportioning of earnings or of fixing of rates. 
8. Procedural Changes 
(a) the Act requires the Board to hear and decide cases speedily 
(b) will end the practice of dismissing applications on 
procedural grounds; thereby allowing applicants to appeal decisions to 
the courts. 
VITA 
David S. Cross 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Doctor of Education 
Thesis: A IDSTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATION OF U.S. 
AIRLINES 
Major Field: Curriculum & Instruction 
Area of Specialization: Aviation Education 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Miami, Florida, June 21, 1960, the son of 
Mary and Alan Cross, Jr. Wife: Leslie. Daughter: Lauren. 
Education: Graduated from Palmetto High School, Miami, 
Florida, in May, 1978; received Bachelor of Science 
degree in Engineering from Vanderbilt University in 
May, 1983; received Master of Education in Aerospace 
from Middle Tennessee State University in August, 1984; 
completed requirements for the Doctor of Education 
Degree at Oklahoma State University in December, 1993. 
Professional Experience: Certified Flight Instructor; Instructor 
Pilot, United States Air Force, 1984 - 1991; Teaching 
Department Head for the Academic Squadron at 
Randolph AFB, TX, 1989 - 1991; Pilot - Delta Air Lines. 
FAA Ratings: Airline Transport Pilot; Flight Engineer - B727; 
Certified Flight Instructor. 
